poses. Thus he supposes that I have failed to think of and provide subsistence, and calls upon his division commander to remonstrate against the march until the supposed deficiency be supplied. He concludes that in the hurry of action I have neglected to provide myself with correct maps drawn to a scale of the approaches to Corinth, and that I was seeking to supply the deficiency by crude sketches of my own, unfit for the ordinary use of the army. He imagines that I was ignorant of Corinth and its surroundings and its defenses and destitute of any maps showing the same. He finds that the army is marched on Corinth in a hasty and disorderly manner. To his vision there is no concerted or systematic plan of attack, but troops were seemingly hurled against the defenses as if to surprise a foe with whom I had been engaged, as he declares, for thirty-six hours. He concludes also that in keeping with this hurry-scurry mode of warfare I had ignored all aid from engineers. It is some consolation to learn from my accuser that this irregular, spasmodic and unscientific method of fighting found me on the night of October 3 in command of a victorious army, inside of the works of a place strongly fortified, supported by an enemy formidable in numbers and fully prepared for a stubborn defense. (See first specification of first charge and the third specification of the first charge.)
In spite of the utter hopelessness of surprising an enemy with whose outposts I had been engaged for thirty-six hours we learn from my accuser that the enemy had failed to avail himself of this long notice and had not called in his re-enforcements and required the further time of the night of October 3 and 4 to bring them in which he says I allowed him by declining to make a night attack, of which advantage he says in his charge, but not in his testimony, the enemy fully availed himself. (See second specification of first charge.)
The first charge and its specifications amount to a suicide in logic and evince a total ignorance of my plan of attacking Corinth. It is not strange that General Bowen should be ignorant of my purpose and of the means by which I hoped to have executed it, for I had not deemed it necessary to inform him on either point. As a brigade commander I thought his duty was to obey orders and I did not call him to counsel with me.
Now this court, in the light of the evidence before it, knows that the attack on Corinth had been the subject of anxious deliberation on my part and on the part of General Price; that I had made ample provisions for the subsistence of my army; that I had taken great pains while in Corinth in April and May to make myself acquainted with Corinth, its surroundings, its approaches, its defenses, and topography; that I was possessed of accurate maps, drawn by competent engineers, Federal and Confederate, showing the same; that General Price had sent me a scout, who, by his directions, had entered Corinth a short time previous to my attack of the place, to inform me of its defenses, and forces; that our march was "not disorderly," but "in perfect order," and not too hasty; that the line of battle was formed and the attack made in accordance with the rule of military science and at points with which I was made entirely familiar by previous service at Corinth while the place was in our possession.
It is charged by my accuser that I failed to avail myself on Friday afternoon of an opportunity to send General Lovell's division pell-mell into Corinth, following what he says was the broken and retreating center of the enemy's lines. Without any knowledge of the condition of affairs on my center and left, and with a conjectural idea of the