session on the march to Corinth? Was it a proper map for military purposes?
Answer. I saw at Ripley, in General Van Dorn's possession two maps, I think, of the region of country embracing Corinth and the roads and approaches and water courses, which had reference to our military operations proposed and present. One of these maps was the most minute and detailed map I have ever seen. It was prepared by Federal officers, and I understand it was taken from the enemy at Iuka. The other map was a carefully and neatly prepared manuscript map, which I under stand was prepared by the engineer officer of General Price's command and had reference to the same region of country. These are all the maps of which I have any knowledge, and I saw them at Ripley's previous to our advance on Corinth in his possession.
Question. Where did you encamp when you came with the Army of the West to Corinth last spring? Did General Van Dorn then have an opportunity of becoming personally acquainted with the ground on which the attack was made?
Answer. General Van Dorn's headquarters were first established between the Charleston and Memphis Railroad and the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, north of the Charleston and Memphis Railroad and west of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and within 200 paces of where he made his headquarters late in the evening of Friday, October 3. His headquarters were there, I think, about a week, and during that time General Van Dorn was much occupied in making himself acquainted with the locality and with the approached and defenses of Corinth. The road by which I went to Corinth on the morning of the 4th with a portion of my troops was laid out and cut out in April last under the personal superintendence of General Van Dorn.
Question. Were troops marched in a hasty or disorderly manner on the advance to Corinth?
Answer. No; I think we marched about 10 or 12 miles a day, and there was no more haste and perhaps better order than was usual in my division in marches.
Question. Was it obvious to your mind that the attack should have been continued Friday afternoon or that success was prevented by waiting until next morning?
Answer. I did not think the attack should have been continued any longer than it was Friday after noon, nor did I think that success was prevented by waiting until next morning.
Question. Could General Van Dorn have prevented the enemy re-enforcing himself the night of the 3d?
Answer. So far as I understood his resources for doing I do not think he could.
Question. Could you tell by the noise of the wagons and artillery carriages whether the enemy was re-enforcing or evacuating?
Answer. No, I could not. I heard a confused rumbling of wheels in Corinth during the large portion of the night.
Question. Do you know that the enemy re-enforced at all?
Answer. I do not.
Question. Are you aware of any circuitous or unnecessary marching on the return from Corinth?
Answer. No; except after we left Ripley and bivouacked on a creek 4 miles from there I was ordered to move my division back toward Ripley to support General Lovell's corps, as I understood, which was reported to the threatened by an attack of the enemy. The head of the division had advanced about 2 miles, I think (not more certainly,) when I received orders of return to the place where we had been bivouacking. I had no means of determining whether the move was necessary or unnecessary. I received orders and obeyed them. And again the night we crossed the Tippah the division (and, I believe, General Price's corps) made a much longer than usual, in consequence, as I understood at the time, of a brigade having been burned on our direct route the night before. That march was about 16 or 18 miles, I think, and we made it on the evening of October 9.