Cypress Creek; the capture muskets and other arms taken across Cypress Creek; the piece of artillery taken possession of fitted up for action. One regiment of my brigade occupied a camp about three-quarters of a mile inside of the enemy's entrenchments. I applied to General Lovell to move on to their support with my brigade. He ordered me to recall the regiment back to the brigade. About an hour afterward we made a circuitous detour to the right (this was about 4 o'clock) and waited in line of battle. After moving about one hour I finally communicated with General Lovell, and ascertained that he was convinced that three redoubts and a line of encampments in their rear had abandoned by the enemy several hours before. We moved on to the encampments, arrived there about an hour and a half before sundown, and received orders to bivouac for the night. The order to me was given about sunset. During the night I could hear from a point a little in advance of my bivouac rumblings of wagons or artillery carriages or both. It was surmised by most of us at that part of the line that the enemy were evacuating the town. In the morning we found a large and formidable force in our front, showing that, whether they had an accession of troops in the town or not, their left wing at least had been materially strengthened. No orders were given tome notifying me or the troops of Lovell's division of these re-enforcements. No preparation seemed to have been made to ascertain their character or extent.
Question. State all that you know relative to the third specification of the first charge.
Answer. On the night of the 3d, between 11 and 12 o'clock, General Lovell summoned Generals Villepigue, Rust, and myself to his headquarters for orders. He showed us a crude sketch of works supposed to be in front of us; also in front of General Price's wing. He could not tell us whether the enemy were being re-enforced or not. Major M. M. Kimmel, of General Van Dorn's staff, who was also present, expressed his ignorance of the same fact to me. The works that were indicated for us to take in the morning were alleged to be one or two redoubts with three guns each. The probabilities were expressed as being in favor of there being but one of these arriving in sight of the works before attempting to take it by storm. In the morning we arrived in line of battle, I on the right, Villepigue on the left, and rust in reserve . Arriving in sight of a large redoubt, with a garrison flag gluing, I halted my command, villepigue doing the same. After three messages to General Lovell, stating our position and urging his presence, I determined to ascertain by the line he arrived something definite in regard to the work in front of us. Satisfied that the information of the night before was not correct, I ordered up the Watson Battery, of my brigade, and opened with spherical-case on the fort. It was responded to by eight or ten heavy guns from the front at as many from either flank from two other forts, which I had not before seen. I should think were about twenty-four pieces of heavy artillery instead of three. After losing about 55 men killed and wounded in the brigade from the shells I withdrew 100 yards in the rear to get cover for the men, still waiting for General Lovell. The enemy became emboldened your apparent apathy and sallied out in front of Villepigue's brigade, who repulsed them. We waited at this point until about 12 o'clock, when a retreat was ordered, and I deployed one of my regiments as skirmishers to cover Rust and myself, Villepigue having been detached and sent to the left. General Lovell arrived on our line of battle between 10 and 11 o'clock having been immediately in the rear up to that time. He gave me no order to advance, but one of his staff inquired of me the practicability of taking the work by storm. I expressed my opinion that the opportunity had been lost, but considered it a questionable enterprise under any circumstances. He then asked me, "Suppose General Lovell orders you to take it?" I replied, "My brigade will march up and be killed.
Question. State what want of consideration and forethought was in your opinion displayed I the attack upon Corinth beyond the particulars in the specification of the first charge.
Answer. I will sate that I was in command of Breckinridge's division at Jackson when the first movement north was spoken by General Van Dorn. I was called in him (General Van Dorn_) to notify me of a contemplated movement and to get the division in readiness. During the conversation-General Lovell being present also- I endeavored to elicit from them what was the point to be attacked. General Van Dorn replied in substance that he intended of maneuver the enemy out of Memphis, Jackson Bolivar, and Corinth . The impression produced on my mind by him was that we were to force the enemy, to leave entrenchments and fight them in the open field. Again, after we had moved up in the vicinity of Davis' Mill, near La Grance, on the Central, on the Central Railroad-the enemy having moved down upon us and were pursued back toward by General Lovell's division, under command of General