and perhaps other places, with forces which aggregate would not be twice or thrice as large as our own, particularly as they seemed to give us credit for having a great many more men than we really had, and i thought it practicable to mass a majority of these troops at any one of these points within thirty-six hours. I had no positive information of these facts. These were only opinions and reasons which influenced my mind in coming to these conclusions.
Question. You say you were ignorant at the Tuscumbia that our army was marching on Corinth. Had the enemy better means of information as to the design of General Van Dorn as to the point he would attack, whether it would be Bolivar or Corinth?
Answer. I have no means of knowing what the sources of the enemy's information are with regard to General Van Dorn's movement or the movements of his army.
Question. Did you suppose we were marching to attack the enemy at any point; if so, what?
Answer. I did not. I recollected the remark that General Van Dorn made about maneuvering the enemy out of his fortifications, and supposed that this might be his object. I contented myself with executing orders as well as I could.
Question. Had you any idea what that maneuvering must be to have the effect of getting the enemy out of Corinth?
Answer. Numbers my own idea was that the enemy might be maneuvered out by getting in his rear, by cutting off his or threatening to do so, or occupying his own base.
Question. When did you arrive at the camp on the Hatchie?
Answer. My command arrived there very late at night. The place at which I was ordered to encamp wa a mile or two to the right of Bowen, in the bottom or swamp. The forest and foliage was so very dense that the darkness made it impossible to get the train straightened out and in place.
Question. When did you get orders to cook three days' rations?
Answer. I suppose about 4 or 5 o'clock in afternoon.
Question. When did you turn over rations to General Price's command?
Answer. I left them in the swamp and woods at this place which i described, having been ordered to leave them where I encamped, and notified General Maury that I had left them and where he would find them.
Question. Would it have been possible to cook any rations during to night?
Answer. It was possible. I did cook one day's rations for my command. It was impossible on account of the inadequate supply of cooking utensils in the command to cook the three day's rations by the time we were ordered to march in the morning. The best officers commanding regiments declared it was utterly impossible and I agreed with them. That night the men were much fatigued. On the day previous, being encamped north of Ripley 4 miles, I was ordered to have my command at the road from Ripley to Ruckersville at 8 o'clock and to fall in the rear of General Hebert's command. I did so, but was detained there until nearly 5 o'clock by the troops in front of me. I received an order that night if I had not passed General Hebert to encamp with him or at the same place. On reaching his headquarters he informed me that there was not nearly enough water there for his own command. I procured a guide, who took me through the fields and woods 1 1/2 miles or 2 miles to a branch, which supplied me with water. It was very late before my men could rest or sleep. For the same reason the same thing happened the next day, and hence it was that my men were tired when they got to the Hatchie.
Question. Do you know whether or not the miscarriage of the wagons on our return to Holly Springs was fault of General Van Dorn, or if they were not immediately ordered on the right road as soon as the fact was reported to him?
Answer. I presume they were. I do not know that it was his fault. The fault may have been with those under him. I do not know whose fault it was.