which extended about 100 yards in front of their works. On reaching this point we charged and carried the enemy's works the whole extent of our line and penetrated to the very heart of Corinth, driving the enemy from house to house and frequently firing in at the windows and driving them out. The enemy were driven from the breastworks in great confusion, leaving their guns, some with the teams still hitched, while others had their horses cut loose and ran off. Our men brought off two or three horses which they found hitched int he streets near the Corinth House, their owners being absent. The Forty-second Alabama, from their position in line, were brought in front of a strong bastion, the walls of which they found too high to scale, but rushing to the embrasures they fired three or four volleys, driving the enemy from their guns, and then entering the work mounted the parapet and planted their flag on the walls. After entering the works we found ourselves opposed by an overwhelming force, and being without support and our lines broken and disordered in the assault, we had no alternative left but to fall back, which was done.
Our loss in this assault was very severe. Three of the five regimental commanders were either killed or wounded.
I can bear testimony to the coolness and gallantry with which our men and officers made this assault. I do not believe that any troops ever displayed greater courage in so desperate a charge.
This was our last engagement in the vicinity of Corinth. Our division being reformed, we fell back on the road to Pocahontas and bivouacked for the night.
At an early hour on the morning of the 5th instant our brigade was ordered to the front to act as an advance guard. When within 2 or 3 miles of Davis' Bridge, across the Hatchie, we received orders to push forward, cross the bridge, form line of battle on the right of the road, and then advance, taken, and hold the heights at Metamora, which command the crossing at Davis' Bridge. We pushed forward with all possible dispatch, but, the men being greatly exhausted and weak for want of foot and the previous two days' marching and hard service, when we reached the crossing and formed line we did not have more than 250 or 300 men in ranks. We formed on the right, opposite the battery established by Major Burnet on the left of the road. As we were filing off to the right the enemy's batteries opened on us from the hill at Metamora. The Second Texas, being in the rear, was cut off by this fire and did not form in line with the other regiments. Our position was now in a narrow strip of woods with open fields in front and rear, that in front extending up to the enemy's position. We had been ordered to advance with our left on the road, which would have carried us through the open field up to the very muzzles of the enemy's guns. Being now satisfied that the hill was occupied in force and to advance with our small force would only prove its total annihilation, we dispatched Lieutenant McFarland to the rear for re-enforcements and to report to the general commanding that we not only could not advance successfully, but we thought we could not hold our present position long without assistance. During this time the enemy continued to pour a heavy fire into the battery and the woods occupied by our line, in which we lost several men killed. and wounded. The batteries being soon withdrawn the enemy now gave us their whole attention, but we still held our position until they reached our left flank and poured into us a most destructive fire. This threw our line into some confusion, but rallying we moved to the left, faced the enemy, and opened on them. We had not fired more than or three rounds before a perfect shower of balls was poured