8 or 10, including 1 officer. This regiment advanced with remarkable steadiness, this being their first engagement. Advancing about a fourth of a mile, we were halted to form a junction with Lovell's fove, now on our right, which we failed to do. Our skirmishers again soon engaged the enemy and were driven back on our line, which led to a severe but short engagement, in which we soon routed the enemy and drove them from their position. Here an unfortunate mistake was committed, the Forty-second Alabama firing on our skirmishers, mistaking them for the enemy, killed and wounding several officers and men.
At this time a cannonading was kept up at some distance to our right from a strong work of the enemy about 200 yards south of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Being now re-enforced by Colonels Johnson's and Dockery's (Arkansas) regiments, we charged direction to the right, throwing forward the left wing, and moved in the direction of the firing. We soon reached the railroad, having our line of battle nearly parallel to it, and on crossing the enemy opened on us a most terrific fire from the brow of a hill not more than 75 yards distant. The enemy opposed us with a heavy force, being formed in two lines, the fire staggered us but for a moment, and as soon as our line was steadied a little we charged, drove them from the position, and carried their works, capturing a few prisoners, and taking a large camp, with their supplies of commissary and quartermaster's stores. On discovering our approach the enemy removed and saved their guns. This we found to be a strong work, in a fine position, and well constructed. From the position we judged this to be the point from which a cannonading had been kept up during the day.
Being now separated from our division and night approaching (being between 3 and 4 o'clock), we dispatched Lieutenant McFarland to report to General Maury our success and ask for orders. In the courage of half an hour General Lovell and staff came up, and on consultation we agreed to form a line of battle perpendicular to the railroad, our left resting on the road and advance toward Corinth. In about an hour his forces came up an moved to our right. At about dark, while waiting for a notification from General Lovell to advance, which he said he would give when ready, we received orders from General Maury to rejoin the division and take position on Phifer's right, which brought us on the hill in sight of Corinth about an hour and a half after dark, where we slept on our arms until morning.
At early dawn on the morning of the 4th, batteries having been placed in front of our lines to open fire on Corinth, the brigade was moved by the left flank and placed in rear of Phifer, sheltered by timber in front. When the firing from the batteries ceased we moved forward and took position obliquely to the right and front of Phifer. Our skirmishers were again thrown forward, and kept up a sharp engagement with the enemy until about 10 o'clock. We had been previously notified by General Maury that we would advance when Hebert's division made the attack on our left, our brigade being supported by Cabell's on our right and phifer's on the left.
About 10 o'clock the firing on our left became heavy and we at once gave the command forward, sending Lieutenant McFarland to notify General Maury of our advance movement. We had not gone 100 yards before the enemy seemed to discover our designs and at once opened on us, and kept up the severest fire I ever imagined possible to concentrate on one point in front of a fortification, yet we suffered but little, being protected by timber until we reached the fallen timber and open space