gained in Maryland. I replied to the insolent demand through the commanding officer of my cavalry advance.
During the early part of the afternoon of the same day my pickets on the Jacinto road were driven in. About 2.30 o'clock they reported that the enemy were advancing on that road in force. I ordered General Little to send Hebert's brigade to meet them and soon afterward directed Martin's brigade to follow it. Both brigades moved to the field gladly and gallantly. They met the enemy, commanded by Rosecrans in person, within a mile of the town. The line of battle was instantly formed and the fight began, and was waged with a severity which I have never seen surpassed. I had myself gone to the field, accompanied by General Little and my staff. Discovering that the enemy's force, which turned out to be their right wing, about 8,000 strong, under Rosecrans in person, was much grater than I had been led to believe, I directed General Little to bring forward his two other brigades, which were some 2 miles distant. Just there he fell, pierced through the brain with a Minie ball.
Meanwhile Hebert's and Martin's brigades carried on the unequal contest not only successfully but gloriously. They drove the enemy from every position a distance of more than 600 yards, capturing 9 pieces of artillery and taking about 50 prisoners. They were finally staid in their triumphant progress by the darkness just as the First and Third Brigades of Little's division reached the field, eager to avenge the death of their friend and commander. The division bivouacked upon the field of battle.
I has proposed to renew the battle in the morning and had made my dispositions accordingly, but having ascertained toward morning that the enemy had by means of the two railroads massed against me a greatly superior force, and knowing that my position was such that a battle would endanger the safety of my trains even if I should be victorious, of which I had but little doubt, I determine to adhere to my original purpose and to make the movement upon which I had already agreed with General Van Dorn. Orders were issued accordingly, and the wagons trains having been put in motion, the troops were withdrawn from the battle-field a little before sunrise, the enemy manifesting no desire to renew the bloody conflict and firing only two or three shots at my cavalry rear guard. Every wagon and all of the valuable stores that we had taken, together with many of the sick and wounded, were safely brought away.
General Maury, who had taken position with two of his brigades on the heights east of the town so as to cover the movement, says in his report:
The train and army having marched past me, I withdrew from my position by order of the commanding general at 8 a. m. and marched in rear of the army. The enemy followed us feebly with cavalry chiefly, which was held in check all the time by the cavalry under General Armstrong covering my rear.
About 2 p. m., while halted at a point about 8 miles from Iuka, the pursuing enemy was drawn into an ambuscade, admirably planned and executed by General Armstrong, Colonel Rogers, and Captain Bledsoe. they received the fire of the Second Texas Sharpshooters and of Captain Bledsoe's battery at short range, and were charged by McCulloch's cavalry and utterly routed. During the remainder of the march to Baldwyn they ventured within range no more.
General Maury also speaks in terms of just praise of the great efficiency and skill with which the cavalry force was handled by General Armstrong, and of a very daring and successful ambuscade planned and executed on the 17th by Colonels Wirt Adams and Slemons, com-