without that it will be useless to continue the pursuit; and, as I advised you last night, I shall direct my main force by the most direct route upon Nashville, where its presence will certainly be required, whether for offensive or defensive objects. I propose to take the old divisions which I brought out of Tennessee, to each brigade to take the old divisions which I brought out of Tennessee, to each brigade of which I have added a new regiment, and one other (Sheridan's), composed about two-thirds of new regiments. Kentucky should not, under the present condition of things, be left with less than 30,000 men to guard communications and repel raids. I propose for the present to place one brigade at Lebanon, one at Munfordville, one division at Bowling Green, besides the necessary bridge guards at various points. General Wright has, I believe, moved one division to Lexington. That force should be kept there, or, better still - as long as the roads are in condition so that it can be supplied - should be thrown forward to London. There should be two regiments of cavalry at Lexington, two at Bowling Green, and two at Lebanon. They should be employed actively against guerrilla bands and concentrate rapidly against more formidable cavalry raids. There can, however, be no perfect security for Kentucky until East Tennessee is occupied. There has been no time hitherto hen that could be done with any prospect of permanency. With the force that was available we should have marched into the very heart of the enemy's resources and away from our own, just as Bragg did in invading Kentucky, and with any means that we have hitherto had the result must have been similar. The enemy will regard the invasion of East Tennessee as the most dangerous blow at the rebellion, and will, it seems to me, turn his greatest efforts against it, limiting his operations in Virginia if necessary to the defense of Richmond. From this our estimate can be formed of the force with which it should be undertaken or at least followed up.
D. C. BUELL,
FRANKFORT, KY., October 17, 1862.
Colonel Tafel, of the One hundred and sixth Ohio Regiment, of my command, reports to me that the arms issued to his command are utterly worthless; that the tubes of many of the guns are crushed down; that the bayonets are of iron; that many of the guns are not straight and fire with no certainty; that when they are put in the best order of which they are susceptible many of them will not fire; in short, that they are worthless guns, and that they have been condemned on tow different occasions.
This is a good regiment, but the character of their arms is well calculated to discourage them and produce dissatisfaction; but, above all, they could not be effective if brought into action. All efforts to get better guns thus far have proved unavailing, the ordnance officer at Louisville saying that he could not substitute better duns without an order direct from the War Department at Washington.
OCTOBER 17, .
J. F. ROBINSON, Governor of Kentucky, Louisville:
I have received your dispatch.* I have myself been mortified and
* Not found.