Boyle says Buell has evacuated McMinnville and burned stores and that Bragg and Kirby Smith threaten to attack him. He says also that Colonel Miller, who has force south of Gallatin, wishes him to send force down to tunnel with impressed negroes to protect and clean it out. What force will it take for this and to open rest of communication? Let me have your views by Colonel Garrard, if he is still with you. Troops come in slowly.
H. G. WRIGHT,
HDQRS. 1ST DIV., ARMY OF THE MISS.,
Tuscumbia, Ala., August 28, 1862.
I. First Division will march as soon as possible in the following order:
The Second Brigade, under Brigadier General James D. Morgan, will cross the Tennessee River at Jackson's Crossing and pursue the route already indicated to him. The Twenty-second Regiment Illinois Volunteers will report to General Morgan, and constitute a part of his command until a junction is made with the First Brigade.
The First Brigade, excepting the Twenty-second Regiment Illinois Volunteers, will cross the river at Decatur at such time as required, of which Colonel Roberts will be notified by telegraph, and march as indicated by telegraph.
II. Numbers tents or baggage will be taken except the knapsacks of the men and a small valise or small trunk for the officers. All the baggage will be stored with the quartermaster at Tuscumbia. All of the officers will confine themselves and their men to their commands respectively, as no one will be permitted to straggle from the line of march, and every one guilty of pillaging will be severely punished. Supplies of vegetables, fruit, forage, &c., will be collected by the quartermaster and commissary and distributed daily to the several commands.
III. The men are cautioned to carefully save their rations, as there may be a short allowance for the march.
By order of Brigadier General E. A. Paine:
W. H. CONNER,
DECHERD, TENN., August 29, 1862-2 p.m.
Major General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief:
Every day renders it the more evident that we must abandon our extensive lines and concentrate at some point nearer our base of supplies, perhaps Murfreesborough. Our communications are interrupted almost daily and our detachments captured by superior numbers. Our communications are not yet opened with Louisville, and cannot be without putting a larger force on the road than can be spared. I yield to this conviction with painful reluctance. I cannot collect at any point this side of Murfreesborough more than 30,000 men, and from that would have to be deducted something for convoys. It would be worse in advance of this point; and, besides, the character of the roads and of the country makes it impossible to subsist ourselves in the mountains. I am therefore preparing to concentrate at Murfreesborough. I suppose