huntsville, July 31, 1862.
Major-General McCOOK, Battle Creek:
All commanders of cavalry will make requisitions at once for the horses they may require; numbers will be sent by telegraph and formal requisitions sent by mail or messenger.
J. M. WRIGHT.
(Same to Lieutenant-Colonel Murray and Brigadier-Generals Nelson and Wood.)
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
Huntsville, July 31, 1862.
Colonel J. F. MILLER,
Commanding at Nashville:
SIR: The general commanding directs that you have stockades erected for the defense of every bridge on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad in Tennessee; the stockades to be made according to the plan and the guards to be strictly governed by the instructions inclosed herewith. Please acknowledge reception of this by telegraph.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. M. WRIGHT,
CUMBERLAND GAP, July 31, 1862.
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram. Up to my last advice the enemy had about 7,500 or 8,000 men of all arms at Thornville, Bear's Station, Blair's Cross-Roads, Powder Spring Gap, Cedar Ford, and occasionally Morristown and Rutledge. His cavalry occupied intermediate points in front of these places. My scouts will be in on the 2nd or 3rd proximo. By the 20th proximo I can be ready to advance with three brigades, and with that force can reach Knoxville. Unless it would interfere with your plans I would respectfully suggest the destruction of the Watauga Bridge, in the northeast part of Tennessee, and the trestle work near Greeneville. This would cut off re-enforcements from Virginia and give you the use of the railroads in the greater part of East Tennessee. I name the 20th proximo, because by that time important works will be completed which will render this position secure in the event of a reverse. I expect to receive from 6,000 to 10,000 Tennessee recruits by the 15th proximo, but I have agreed to send a force to escort them. They would be efficient in rifle pits. If the date suggested be too late I will make every effort to be ready at any earlier date you may direct. Knoxville can be approached by several routes, but I would prefer not making a move until I can obtain intelligence as to the enemy's strength and position. Our supplies are rather short, as we were cut off from Lexington for eight or ten days by Morgan's raid, but trains commence to arrive.
GEORGE W. MORGAN,