manded the approach by the railroad embankment. The Valverde Battery, Captain Sayers, on the left of Green's command; Colonel Gray's Twenty-eighth Louisiana Regiment occupying the center, with a section of Cornay's battery light artillery and Semmes' battery posted along the center, and a 24-pounder siege gun in position under Lieutenant Tarleton, of Cornay's battery, commanding the road along the west bank of the bayou. The gunboat Diana, commanded by Lieutenant Nettles, of the Valverde Battery, heading down the stream on the line of our defenses, and on the east side of the bayou the Yellow Jacket Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Fournet; Crescent Regiment, Colonel Bosworth; Eighteenth Louisiana Regiment, Colonel Armant, with Faries' Pelican Battery of light artillery, posted along the line, and Colonel Bagby's regiment, Seventh Texas Moutned Volunteers dismounted, thrown forward as skirmishers and sharpshooters to the front and in the woods on the extreme left, which woods terminated on the left in a swamp. The Second Louisiana Cavalry, Colonel Vincent, and Fourth Texas Mounted Volunteers, Colonel Reily, were, during the morning, held in the rear of our line as reserves. Learning that a gunboat and several transports of the enemy had been seen in Grand Lake, Vincent's regiment was ordered about midday to proceed to Verdun's Landing and watch the movements of these boats, preventing them from making a landing at that point, which was only 4 miles to the left and rear of our position. A section of Cornay's battery was also ordered to report to Colonel at Verdun's.
Shortly after the close of this engagement I received information that five of the enemy's gunboats, with several transports towing barges and flats crowded with troops and artillery, had gone up Grand Lake, and were lying off Hudgins' Point, when Vincent's regiment, re-enforced with another section of Cornay's battery, was ordered ot that point, with instructions to prevent, if possible, a landing by the enemy at Hudgins' and Charleston. A few hours later I proceeded in person to Vincent's command, leaving Major Brent and Major Levy, of my staff, to make the necessary arrangements with Brigadier-General Sibley for an attack by our forces on the enemy at daylight the next morning. By leaving a small force behind our earthworks I was satisfied that the other troops, assisted by the Diana, moving down the bayou on a line with the attaching column on the west bank of the bayou could drive the enemy back, throw him in confusion, and render it necessary for him to withdraw the force which he was endeavoring to land in our rear to the assistance of his army in our front. Shortly after 9 o'clock on Sunday night Major Brent and Major Levy proceeded to communicate these orders to Brigadier-General Sibley, then commanding the forces south of Red River, but the supineness of that officer, who delayed communicating with Brigadier-General Mouton until 2 o'clock in the morning, and his positive declaration of the impracticability of carrying the plan into execution for want of time frustrated the scheme, which I am satisfied would have accomplished the most favorable results if actively attempted. I returned to our front about daylight, and was informed by Major Brent and Major Levy of the failure of Brigadier-General Sibley to organize the attack.
On Monday morning, at about 9 o'clock, the enemy commenced again to advance slowly on our line, having in the mean time thrown a largely increased force of cavalry, artillery, and infantry on the east bank and concentrated a large artillery force on the west bank, besides strengthening his front line of attack on that bank.