ashore all our tents and baggage, but two loads of ammunition, hospital stores, and provisions, and leaving all who were likely to prove noneffective in a fatiguing march, and, possibly, a fight, I went over to the pontoon wharf on John's Island. The tide was strong, and, in spite of careful management, the steamer struck and seriously injured the wharf, so that I was obliged to land my men and baggage by small boats. The commanding officers of the gunboat Crusader very kindly lent me a large boat, and furnished a good crew, who worked all night. The morning was far advanced before I could possibly get ready to march. Other regiments and the battery and cavalry were brought over by the wharf. A portion of the battery and most of the infantry started before I did. (I forgot to mention that three companies of the Forty-sixth New York, under Captain---, were attacked to us, it having been found impossible to take the whole of the Forty-sixth from Tybee, as was intended.)
We moved at noon on the 2nd. It was exceedingly hot, and, going on foot myself, I regulated the march most carefully. The Third New Hampshire and a portion of the battery passed us on the way. Arriving within a mile of Haulover Cut, we found a portion of the force halted and another portion returning from a rod on the right, which it was said it had taken by mistake. I think it was not far from 4 o'clock, possibly a little later, when we arrived at the Cut. Two regiments, at least (the Sixth Connecticut Volunteers was one of them), had crossed the causeway and brigade, and occupied the rising ground about the large house. Before sunset the infantry (all, I am quite sure), a portion at least of the artillery, which was composed of Hamilton's or Ransom's battery, and a section of the Rhode Island, and some of the cavalry had arrived at the Cut. We bivouacked, amy command forming the reserve, perhaps 40 yards from the causeway. On this ground we remained Monday night and until Thursday morning. During Tuesday the cavalry continued to come up. I cannot say positively whether or not all that a section or so of the artillery did not get there until Tuesday. I had been ordered to leave Pulaski with three days' cooked rations and five uncooked (the intention having been, as before stated, to send us to the Stono directly). As my cooked rations would run out Tuesday night, I took advantage of the delay to run my single wagon (one had been lost in unloading in the Edisto) back to the landing for the rations I had been obliged to leave there. Wednesday there was much regret expressed at the delay, and many of the regiments began to get out of food. All the transportation at command, including what could be detachment from s the artillery, was most actively employed in running back upon 5 miles to the landing for provisions, &c. We understood at the time that the delay was unavoidable on account of the defective transportation and the great labor of bringing over the artillery and cavalry and the horses and wagons belonging to the infantry.
General Wright came on Wednesday, not till afternoon, I think, having remained at the Edisto to drive the work. There was a hasty review of the force toward sunset on Wednesday.
Sunday and Monday were pleasant days. Tuesday and Tuesday night it rained most heavily, and some rain fell on Wednesday, though I do not find that my letters to my wife (which I consult for some of these facts) make any mention of that.
In conversations the force as amounting to about 5,000, including the artillery, eight pieces, and about 600 of the First Massachusetts Cav-