boats ready, and the men under arms for crossing, when they were re-called (as I hoped only temporarily by the announcement of Admiral DuPont that he had resolved to retire, and that consequently we could expect no assistance from the Navy. Immediately the admiral was waited upon by an officer of my staff, who represented the forwardness of our preparations for crossing, the evidently unprepared condition of the enemy to receive us or drive us back if once our crossing was effected, while any delay, now that our intentions were remarked, would give the enemy time to erect upon the southern end of Morris Island commanding Light-House Inlet, those works and batteries which he had heretofore neglected. To these considerations, earnestly and elaborately urged, the admiral answer was that "he would not fire another shot."
A lodgment on Morris Island was thus made impossible for us, the enemy having powerful works on the island, more especially at the northern end, out of which we could not hope to drive him unless aided by a cross-fire from the Navy. I therefore determined to hold what we had got until the admiral should have had time to repair his vessels, and to this hour we hold every inch of ground on Polly and Cole's and Seabrook Islands that we held on the day of the expected crossing. Since then I have exercised with the admiral and have pushed forward my works and batteries on Folly Island with unremitting diligence; the enemy meanwhile, now thoroughly aroused to their danger, throwing up works that completely command Light-House Inlet, on the southern end of Morris Island; so that the crossing which could have been effected in a couple of hours and with but little sacrifice six weeks ago will now involve, whenever attempted, protracted operations and a very serious loss of life. And to what end should this sacrifice be made without the co-operation of the Navy? Even when established on the southern end of Morris Island, the northern end, with its powerful works and commanded by the fire of Forts Sumter and Johnson, would still remain to be possessed. The sacrifice would be of no avail without the aid of the Navy, and I have been painfully but finally convinced that from the Navy no such aid is to be expected.
I fear Admiral DuPont districts the iron-clads so much that he has resolved to do nothing with them this summer, and I therefore most earnestly beg you to liberate me from those orders to "co-operate with the Navy" which now tie me down to share to admiral's inactivity. Remaining in our present situation we do not even detain one soldier of the enemy from service elsewhere. I am well satisfied that they have already sent away from Charleston and Savannah all the troops not absolutely needed to garrison the defense, and these will have to remain in the works whether an enemy be in sight or not. Liberate me from this order to "co-operate with the Navy in an attack on Charleston" and I will immediately place a column of 10,000 of the best drilled soldiers in the country (as unquestionably are the troops of this department) in the heart of Georgia, our landing and march being made-through counties in which, as shown by the census, the slave population is 75 per cent. of the inhabitants. Nothing is truce, sir, than that this rebellion has left the Southern States a mere hollow shell. If we avoid their few strongholds, where they have prepared for and invited us to battle, we shall meet no opposition in a total devastation of their resources, thus compelling them to break up their large armies and garrisons at a few points into scores of small fractions of armies for the protection of every threatened or assailable point. I will guarantee, with the troops now fruitlessly though laboriously occupying Folly and Seabrook Islands and such other troops as can be spared from the