reported that two gunboats had dropped down to the mill, taken their men on board, and were then lying off Tar Bluff. Major Emanuel then moved the piece of artillery to Mr. Middleton's gate and left it there, and with his party (4 in number) moved on to Tar Bluff (distance, 2 miles). As they went down heard shelling at Field's Point; went on the bluff, and found Lieutenant Hewit and Fripp watching the boat, which was lying in the river, distant about 150 yards. Major Emanuel sent back for the piece of artillery, but just as the courier started the boat moved off down the river; waited fifteen or twenty minutes and artillery came up. Major Emanuel then took it, unsupported except by his small party, and took a rear road to Field's Point; when about half way found he was surrounded by the enemy in ambush on both sides of the road, delivering a cross-fire and wounding Fripp (who has since died from his wounds). The piece of artillery fired four shots, and then Major Emanuel ordered a retreat and fell back to Tar Bluff. A few moments after reaching there Lieutenant Breeden and his command came up. After a delay of fifteen minutes a squad of his men were sent down to Field's Point by the rear road, while the rest marched by the main road. Here Mr. Pipkin states that he left them, but was told when the party reached the point the enemy had left.
From these statements, and from the reports sent in, it appears that on the 2nd June, 1863, at 7 a. m., Major Emanuel received notice of the presence of these boats in the Combahee River; that he at once communicated with district headquarters and made the following disposition of the troops at his command: Captain Godbold was ordered to send Lieutenant Gilchrist with a detachment of 20 men to Field's Point, whilst he with the rest of his company would repair to Stoke's Causeway to support two pieces of Bomar's artillery, ordered to take position there. Lieutenant Bredeen, with his company, was ordered to the plantation of Colonel Heyward, near to Combahee Ferry. The remaining two pieces of Bomar's artillery were also ordered to this point, where they would have proved most serviceable, but Major Emanuel, influenced by incorrect information, not reliable, reported to him through Lieutenant Hendriox, and from a total want of acquaintance with the country and its localities countermanded this order and sent these pieces around 16 miles to protect the Salkehatchie Railroad bridge, which point was only 5 miles from the district headquarters,m and entirely protected by those forces, from which he (Major Emanuel) would expect and re-enforcements. He thus committed the serious error of materially weakening his small force to guard a point well protected by troops much nearer. The first disposition of his forces by Major Emanuel seems to have been judicious, and should have been attended, if properly carried out, with better results, but with the first error resulted others. From this point there seems to have been confusion of counsel, indecision, and great tardiness of movement, an entire want of active and vigorous enterprise, without which, while they followed after the movements of the enemy, they nether opposed nor disturbed them in their work of wicked destruction. The cause are many. This command of Major Emanuel has not been properly drilled, disciplined, or taught by him, so as to be effective upon an emergency. His system of outposts is loose and men and officers badly instructed. On this occasion his pickets were neither watchful nor brave; they allowed the enemy to come up to them almost unawares, and then retreated without offering resistance or firing a gun, allowing a parcel of negro wretches, calling themselves soldiers, with a few degraded whites, to march unmolested, with the incendiary torch, to rob, destroy, and burn a large