had a single company of Arkansas mounted men. I wanted men who would work. I anticipated an invasion of the country by 10,000 or 15,000 men, and knew that field works were necessary to enable me to repulse them. If I had infantry I would have placed them on the Arkansas with a battery or two and erected works there, with a reserve, and works on the Canadian, and kept the mounted men in the field in the Cherokee country as soon as the grass came up. As it was, I was left at last with the very troops I never asked for and did not want and to which I attached no value whatever. I tried to increase my artillery force, but found it impossible. A company was raised in Southern Arkansas and offered to General Hindman. He refused it. It then applied to him for orders to join me, and his reply was an order to march to Little Rock, where he had not a gun for it. Ordered on June 29 to march in four days at furthest, Colonel Stevens' regiment managed to get off on July 15. Ordered on June 29 to be ready to follow with me on twenty-four hours' notice, the last company of Colonel Alexander's regiment reached the Canadian on July 29. I moved on the 21st with the artillery, just then got ready, leaving five of Colonel Alexander's companies still behind. What a commentary on the value of mounted troops! They had returned on June 25, 26, and 27 from furlough to reap the west harvest, and every man came with his horse to be shod before he could march. These regiments have given me inconceivable trouble, and but for my intense desire to hold the Indian country as long as possible I would at once have resigned when left with no other troops to defend it except the Indians.
On my way to Canadian I received the order (a copy of which I inclose)* directing me to send my best battery, with a squadron or company of cavalry, to Colonel Charles A. Carroll, at Fort Smith. Incensed at this most insulting order, which justified my already firm belief that there existed a deliberate intention, by continual aggression and insult, to drive me out of the Indian country, I immediately sent orders to the artillery, then a day's march ahead, to proceed to Fort Smith, and gave orders to Corley's company of Arkansas cavalry, then with me and the best company I had, to do the same. I was very willing that General Hindman should have the credit and bear the responsibility of taking out of the Indian country to present to Colonel Carroll the only battery of artillery available and the last armed man from Arkansas; but the next day I reflected that I ought not to connive at so great a wrong, and I sent forward orders to the artillery and Corley's company to take the road to the Canadian, which they did. If I had not already resigned I should have done so on receiving this last order from General Hindman. The guns of the battery had been cast for me, and I had bought nearly all the horses for it, advancing my own moneys to do so. It had just been got in condition for service, and I had no horses for any other guns nor men enough to man half a battery. There is a time, it is said, when patience ceases to be a virtue, and that time had passed with me before. Besides the indignity to myself, no man could retain the respect of the Indians who could not help being dealt with in that fashion; nor did I ever agree to become a sort of quartermaster to procure arms, ammunition, and supplies, and have cast and equip cannon, and with my own means buy horses for other generals and colonels commanding petty posts. While General Hindman was ordering here and there without knowing what he was about, or having the most remote idea of the Indian country's needs, I was without a single percussion cap to
* See Hindman to Pike, p.970.