5th. Why was it that measures were not taken by Colonel Lipscomb to immediately surround the camp of the marauders after the skirmish?
(This force was but 150 at the highest, whilst his force numbered between 500 and 600 men.)
6th. Why was it that they were permitted to remain in the unmolested possession of the so-called battle ground and allowed to depart in peace at 2 o'clock the next morning?
(Their camp was only 1 mile from that of Colonel Lipscomb's and in the brush, whilst Colonel Lipscomb's men were encamped close to the brush and in an open field, with but poor measures against an attack, to which they were greatly exposed.)
7th. Why was the pursuit of these scamps delayed until 10 or 11 o'clock the next morning?
(The robbers made their escape from the brush about 2 a.m. that day.)
Among the robbers were, according to the statement of officers and citizens, at least two-thirds who had been released upon oath and given bond.
The most of these men were set afloat by one Strachan, provost-marshal at Palmyra, notwithstanding the evidence against them was such that the rope would have been too costly with which they should have been hung. In regard to the character of Strachan I respectfully refer to Lieutenant-Colonel Gilstrap, of the Union citizens of this vicinity.
Another case has been reported to me which seems to me of rather serious turn:
When the First Battalion was engaged with the robbers in the brush and assistance needed, Captain Robbins of that battalion went to Major Benjamin, who was standing quiet with his men, and requested him to bring his men on into action. Seeing nothing was done, he offered to lead the men himself, but was peremptorily told that the men should not go. Who caused that refusal?
One more item I would mention: The late General Orders, No. 3, in regard to rebels and rebel sympathizers, has as yet in no instance been enforced, and it is the opinion of many in that part of the country that on account of the non-enforcement of that order in that region it is regarded by the robbers as a mere threat and humbug.
I have thus presented to you, for the information of the general commanding, such items as have partially come under my own observation and partially reached me through others, and in such cases I have mentioned the authors.
Abundant proof can be produced to sustain my statement.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
F. W. REEDER,
Lieutenant and Instructor of Cavalry.
HEADQUARTERS INDIAN EXPEDITION, Camp and Grand River, July 18, 1862.
To commanders of the different corps constituting Indian Expedition:
SIRS: In military as well as civil affairs and violent wrongs need speedy and certain remedies. The time had arrived, in my judgment, in the history of this expedition when the greatest wrong ever perpetrated upon any troops was about to fall with crushing weight