my quarters soon after midnight, and left about 2 o'clock in the morning of the 28th.
At our interview I urged on him the importance of pushing forward Franklin as early as possible. Hearing about noon that General McClellan had not reached Alexandria, I telegraphed, at 12.40 p. m.(28th), to General Franklin, if he had not acted on general McClellan's order to do so on mine, and move toward Manassas Junction. At 1 p. m. General McClellan telegraphed to me that the moment Franklin could be started with a reasonable amount of artillery he should go forward. At 2.45 he telegraphed some rumors he had heard about the enemy's movements, and expressed an opinion that the troops sent from Alexandria should be in force, and with cavalry and artillery, or we should be beaten in detail. I replied at 3.30 p. m. that not a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible toward Manassas, so as to communicate with General Pope before the enemy could be re-enforced. He telegraphed back at 4.45 that Franklin's corps was not in condition to move and fight a battle. At 8.45 I telegraphed to him that there must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps toward Manassas - that they must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready. If we delay too long to get ready there will be no necessity of going at all, for Pope will either be defeated or victorious without our aid If there is a want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons can come to their relief. At 10 he replied that he had ordered Franklin's corps to move at 6 o'clock.
On the morning of the 29th, at 10.30, he telegraphed to me that Franklin's corps had started at 6 a. m., and that he could give him but two squadrons of cavalry. At 12 m. he telegraphed that Franklin's corps was without proper ammunition and without transportation; and again at 1 p. m. he telegraphed that i his opinion Franklin ought not to advance beyond Annandale. At 3.10 p. m. I replied that I wanted Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy; that perhaps he might get such information at Annandale as to prevent his going farther; that otherwise he would push on toward Fairfax. I added that "our people must move more actively and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guesses." Late in the afternoon I heard that Franklin's corps had halted at Annandale, and that he himself fad been seen in Alexandria in the afternoon. I immediately telegraphed to General McClellan at 7.50 p. m. that his (Franklin's) being in Alexandria and his corps halting at annandale was contrary to my orders; that his corps must push forward as I directed, protect the railroad, and open our communication with Manassas. General McClellan replied at 8 p. m., referring to his previous telegrams, and said that he had not deemed it safe for Franklin to march beyond Annandale, and that he was responsible for his being in Alexandria and his corps halting at Annandale.
Early on the morning of the 30th I made inquiries of the Quartermaster-General in regard to transportation, and telegraphed at 9.40 to General McClellan that I was by no means satisfied with General Franklin's march of yesterday (29th). Considering the circumstances of the case he was very wrong in stopping at Annandale. I referred to the fact that he could have obtained transportation of he had applied for it to the Quartermaster's Department, and added: "He knew the importance of opening communication with General Pope's army, and should have acted more promptly."
The foregoing is, I believe, a correct summary of the orders and instructions given by me in regard to the movement of General Franklin's