and hastening their departure for Aquia Creek. The former, however, adds that it was not then known to the accused that he was to be placed under the immediate command of General Pope, the question of the command not having at that time been decided. It should likewise be borne in mind that the transfer of the Army of the Potomac, once begun, was a movement of extreme peril, and that extraordinary efforts on the part of all engaged in it were prompted, not only by those high consideration of patriotism which must be supposed to have been present, but also by the equally urgent instincts of self-preservation. The order of General Halleck, directing the junction of the command of the accused with that of General Pope, seems to have reached him at Aquia Creek. From this he proceeded, in obedience to the order, to effect the junction, and at that time, as we learn from General Burnside, he lacked confidence in General Pope, and shared the distrust, alleged by the witnesses to have been entertained by many officers, of his capacity to conduct the campaign in which the Army of Virginia was then engaged. He reported to General Pope by not on the 26th, and in person on the morning of the 27th of August, 1862, at Warrenton Junction. In the brief conference which ensued between them in the forenoon of that day, he muss have acquired all the information he then possessed as to the plan of the campaign and as to the disposition of the forces of the contending armies. After this conference, at 4 o'clock p.m. of that day, he sent to General Burnside the dispatch first referred to in the testimony. In that dispatch, interspersed amid various items of military intelligence, are found the following expressions:
We are working now to get behind Bull Run, and I presume will be there in a view days, if strategy don't use us up. The strategy is magnificent and tactics in the inverse proportion. I was informed to-day, by the best authority, that, in opposition to General Pope's views, this army was pushed out to save the Army of the Potomac - an army that could take care of itself.
Most of this is private, but if you can get me away, do so.
In another dispatch to the same officer, on 27th August, he says:
Please hasten back the wagons I sent down, and inform McClellan, that I may know that I am doing right.
Again, at 2 p.m. of the 28th, he dispatches:
All that talk about bagging Jackson, &c., was bosh. That enormous gap - Manassas - was left open, and the enemy jumped through, and the story of McDowell having cut off Longstreet had not good foundation. The enemy destroyed an immense amount of property at Manassas - cars and supplies. I expect the next thing will be a raid on our rear by Longstreet, who was cut off.
Another dispatch to same, dated Bristoe, August 28, 1862, 9.30 a.m., and introduced by the accused, concludes as follows:
I hope for the best. My lucky star is always up about my birthday, the 31st, and I hope Mac's is up also. You will hear of us soon by way of Alexandria.
To same officers, from Bristoe, 6 a.m., 29th, he telegraphs:
Heintzelman and Reno are at Centreville, where they marched yesterday. Pope went to Centreville with the last two as a body guard, at the time not knowing where was the enemy, and when Sigel was fighting within 8 miles of him and in sight. Comment is unnecessary. I hope Mac's at work, and we will soon get ordered out of this. It would seem, from proper statements of the enemy, that he was wandering around loose, but I expect they know what they are doing, which is more than any one here or anywhere knows.
The precise import of these remarkable words, in their connection, cannot be mistaken, nor can it fail to be observed how harshly they jar upon the proprieties of military life. It may be safely affirmed that they express, on the part of the accused, and intense scorn and contempt