Having in vain attempted to rally the One hundred and tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers (which, with such company officers, as I could see, was in a shameful rout), I joined the advance on the first field which the enemy had held, where there were many dead and wounded. I questioned such as could answer, and learned that Jackson was present with about 6,000 men, having arrived with the largest part of his command at 3 p.m. He had posted about 3,000 in the first field, and had reserved 3,000 more in position behind the offensive battery and in the woods half a mile to the front. Before communicating this to Colonel Tyler I took the liberty of ordering the cavalry to advance by a side road toward the near of the enemy's reserve, and then communicated to Colonel Tyler, who was advancing his force so as to support Colonels Kimball's and Sullivan's forces, which were nearest the enemy, and moved slowly forward.
The enemy now opened on our line with a heavier fire than before. We maintained our position from the first, and soon drove them in utter confusion down the hill, but the near approach of night forbade farther pursuit, and a halt was ordered. Our troops commenced preparations for bivouacking and for removing our dead. I rode over the field and saw that the enemy could not have lost less than 100 killed and 200 wounded, and judged that our loss was about the same. The wounds of the enemy seemed generally more severe than ours. The cavalry came around the hill at a very good time, and captured about 150 prisoners. On the side of the woods in the rear of the enemy's battery there were one cannon and two overturned caissons. There were large numbers of muskets strewed about in the different fields, which I ordered to be stacked for future removal. Also the enemy seemed to have in many cases thrown aside their equipments to expedite their flight.
As there seemed no further reason to expect attack, I returned to the city and reported myself to your headquarters. I afterward learned that the enemy had twenty-eight pieces of artillery in reserve at Kernstown, which were removed as soon as the day seemed to be unfavorable. The report amongst the people along the road is that Jackson carried back 1,000 less than what went to Winchester.
In regard to the enemy at present, I believe he is near Staunton. Ashby and a considerable amount of cavalry, with two pieces of artillery, are about 3 miles from here. The infantry, it is believed, are entirely worn-out and demoralized, but are too far for us to overtake.
I am, general, with much respect, your most obedient servant,
R. MORRIS COPELAND,
Assistant Adjutant-General and Major Volunteers.
Brigadier General JAMES SHIELDS,
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH CORPS D'ARMEE, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Strasburg, Va., March 26, 1862.
SIR: In reply to your communication I will state what I observed at the first attack by Colonel Ashby on Winchester, March 22. At 2 p.m. a messenger came to General Banks' headquarters, stating that Ashby was advancing on the tow. By order of General Banks all the cavalry under his command was immediately sent to the front. I