As to the direction I gave my troops on bringing them into battle, which General Sigel says was wrong, I have only to say the direction they took was the one given them by the general commanding the army himself. (See General Pope's evidence.)
I did bring them up in the direction of New Market. They passed through New Market, and then were moving up to the left of Reynolds (see evidence of Lieutenant-Colonel Tillson), when they were recalled and brought over to the Warrenton turnpike by the orders of General Pope.
As to General Sigel's charge that he believed that I could be on the battle-field with the greater part of my troops at an earlier hour of the day, it will be seen that General Sigel says he did not now where my corps was or under what orders it acted. It is therefore more an unfriendly suspicion than a well-founded opinion he here expresses.
When I came up with King's division at Manassas-and I lost no time in joining it by a direct route-I found it getting ammunition and rations, for it had been for some time without food.
General Porter's corps came up from Bristoe and was on the west of it, and on the march to the front, which afterward took place under the orders General Pope had given in the first place to General Porter and then to General Porter and myself, it followed after General Porter's corps. As soon as we got to the front and I saw the condition of things and learned from General Buford the strength of the enemy coming through Gainesville, and that it was much inferior in numbers to General Porter's corps, and bearing in mind the troubles and delays I had experienced in getting ahead with a large force in front on the same road, I turned my troops off to the right, up the Sudley Springs road, to the main field, to come on the left of Reynolds. The testimony of Captain Leski, Lieutenant-Colonel Tillson, and Colonel Schriver will show I came back from the head of General Porter's column where my decision had been made, to the head of my own troops at full speed, and that I immediately set them in motion and took measures to get them into action at the earliest moment. How long this took and at exactly what hour they moved I cannot tell. I know, so far as I was concerned, not a moment was lost.
I have tried to answer all of General Sigel's charges, and there now remains but the one, made by General Milroy, if his corps, which may be looked upon as part of the same subject. General Milroy says as follows in his official report:
Shortly after sunset my own brigade had entirely exhausted their ammunition, and it being considered unsafe to bring forward the ammunition wagons where the enemy's shells were constantly flying and exploding, and the enemy having entirely ceased their efforts to break through this part of the line and had thrown the weight of their attack still farther to my left, I ordered my brigade back some one-half of a mile to replenish their ammunition boxes and there wait further orders. I remained on the field with Lieutenants Este and Niles, my own having been sent to see to my regiments. The enemy continued their attacks upon our left until long after dark, which it required the most determined and energetic efforts to rebel. At one time, not receiving assistance from the rear, as I had a right to expect after having sent for it, and our struggling battalions being nearly overcome by the weight and persistence of the enemy's attack, I flew back about one-half mile, to where I understood General McDowell was with a large portion of his corps. I found him, and appealed to him in the most urgent manner to send a brigade forward at once to save the day or all would be lost. He answered coldly, in substance, that it was not his business to help every one, and he was not going to held General Sigel. I told him that I was not fighting with General Sigel's corps; that my brigade had got out of ammunition some