or either of them, or of my own corps. My time and attention were fully otherwise occupied. It has been thought-because later in the day, and when the troops were put in march for Centreville, both Reynolds' division and Sigel's corps passed by Bethlehem Church on the railroad, near which road King had also been-that my whole force, instead of being marched so as to cover a wide front, was marched by a flank along the railroad. General Sigel marched, in spite of my efforts, south of the road; King to the north of the road, with Reynolds to his left. The latter, I am told, tried to move by heads of brigades, but the country was too rough on his left to enable him to continue to do so. When I joined Reynolds' division and gave it orders to go to Centreville it was some distance from Bethlehem Church (see evidence of Colonel Schriver), but went by that place as the nearest way to its destination.
It is to be observed, however, that it is not for any failure in complying with the general order, or in attempting to do so, that General Sigel finds me wanting. It is that for the want of co-operation, as he calls it, between the corps, we lost the opportunity, as he says, to attack the enemy in his left flank while he was retreating from Manassas; that he was of the opinion a battle would be fought near the point where the troops of General McDowell then were, and he ordered all the troops back, and formed them in line of battle, advancing about a mile toward Groveton. To show this to the court, General Sigel has submitted maps, with the position of the enemy placed in a way that supports the view he has taken, and he has sent up the officer of his staff, Major Franz Kappner, who saw the enemy at the time he wished to attack them in flank, and when, by my orders to march to Manassas, he was prevented from doing so.
The witness had also a map with the enemy's position all marked down, showing how he might have been defeated, there being, he says, only one army corps of the enemy there at that time, which, being on the march and not in position, was, according to strategic rules, in danger of being flanked and defeated.
In consequence, he adds, of our retreat from that position the enemy had ample time to put himself in position and await re-enforcements. It will be seen with what confidence General Sigel states where the enemy was going and what was his object. He says:
Jackson changed his position whilst we were on the march to Manassas, and was on his march between Manassas and Gainesville. He therefore was not in order of battle and presented us his left flank, and had he been attacked he would not have been able to come so early to the point he intended to reach between Groventon, Centreville, and New Market.
As it is in Major Kappner's reconnaissance this impression was primarily made on General Sigel, I will refer to it more fully. The major says that at-
About 10 o'clock in the morning, the center of General Sigel's army corps being about 3 miles from Gainesville and taking their rest, some of General Sigel's escort came in and told him that the enemy advanced from the right corner of the left flank. In the proper time I have asked General Sigel for to give me 24 cavalrymen for to go out and see if the information of the scouts was correct.
Going about 1 1/4 miles, he came to a cleared hill, form which he had a "very far view," from which he could see Centreville.
Saw about 5 vedettes to the front toward General Sigel's march line, and about a quarter of a mile distant from that vedettes there was about 50 cavalry of the same vedettes, and [on] the route toward Groveton from New Market I saw an infantry column-about three regiments. All this has happened. I immediately let General Sigel in writing know. I reported to General Sigel that the army (General Sigel's),