Question. Do you know any cause of delay in your getting forward from your bivouac to the place where you turned off; were there any obstructions in the road?
Answer. The road was very much encumbered by wagons; I saw a very large number in the vicinity of this steam-Broad Run.
From all this it is evident-1st, that I took the very measures General Sigel censures me for not having taken; and, 2nd, that General Sigel knew I had taken them. It will not fail to be noticed, however, that what General Sigel condemns me for not having done is precisely that which my then commanding general regrets I did. General Pope says (January 14) in reference to his order, dated Bristoe, August 27, 1862-9 o'clock p.m.:
The order directing General McDowell's march would have carried him to the eastward, and in the same direction in which the main body of the enemy was marching of Longstreet, who was supposed to lead the main body of the enemy, that, by using our whole force vigorously, we should be able to crush Jackson completely before Longstreet by any possibility could have reached the scene of action. I sent nothing to General McDowell concerning Thoroughfare Gap, and regretted afterward that any portion of his forces had been detached in that direction. General McDowell had the discretion, however, necessarily incident to his position and to his distance from me, to make such a disposition to cover his rear as he might consider necessary.
From the order of General McDowell, which he showed me afterward (the Orders No. 7), I understood that the movement of Rickett's division was made conditionally, and in view of the possibility of an attack upon his rear from the direction of Thoroughfare Gap.
It will be seen from General Pope's telegrams to me of the 26th and 27th that after the chances of a battle at or near Warrenton had passed, he expected one might take place near Gainesville; hence his telegraphing me "that we had best move with our whole force to occupy Gainesville, so as to secure our communication with Alexandria." His general order, dated Warrenton Junction, August 27, is to the same end. This order required that my corps, Genera Sigel's corps, and Reynolds' division should pursue the turnpike as far as Gainesville; that the corps of Heintzelman and Reno, and eventually that of Porter, should concentrate in that direction by way of Greenwich, and that Reno and Heintzelman should support me in any operation against the enemy.
My preliminary order of August 27 was based on this order of General Pope and on the information I had received at Buckland Mills and on my way there, which information was then unknown to General Pope, who was not away from telegraph lines. I directed the holding of the strong position of Buckland Mills and Hay Market, with a support at Gainesville (the three places being nearly equidistant from each other), so as to hold or check any force coming through either gap, whilst two of my divisions, with the corps of Heintzelman and Reno, should go against Jackson in the direction of Manassas. I sent to General Pope soon after I received it the information I had obtained of the near approach of Longstreet and informed him of the dispositions I had made. My communication had hardly gone before I received his order to march my whole force to Manassas. Hence my General Orders, No. 10, changing the arrangements I had made and conforming them to General Pope's orders. It will be seen that whilst I did so I provided for the contingency of an attack from Longstreet from the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, which the information I received left no doubt would be made if we did not get forward most expeditiously and at the earliest moment. To make sure of this I ordered the troops to march at 2 o'clock a.m. General Sigel's rear division had been ordered in my preliminary order of 11.30 p.m. of the 27th to march upon Gainesville immediately,