ficed to defend Thoroughfare Gap against the 35,000 men under Longstreet?
Answer. I would have sent about 10,000 men, with the intention to retard the movements of General Longstreet. I don not believe that these troops are sufficient to fight them all day, but I think they were sufficient to retard his movements.
Question by the COURT. Did General McDowell make any, and, if so, what, efforts to hold Thoroughfare Gap against the approach of Longstreet?
Answer. I cannot answer the question. It was my impression that it must have been easy for General Longstreet to march through the Gap and to march to the battle-field. I did not hear of any engagement near Hay Market and the Gap. This induces me to say I do not believe the necessary arrangements were made to hinder Longstreet from joining the army.
Question by the COURT. What advantages would have resulted from preventing or delaying the passage of Thoroughfare Gap by Longstreet on the night of the 28th and morning of the 29th of August?
Answer. The troops of General Longstreet had made a long march, and if they had to form in line of battle near Thoroughfare Gap or Hay Market they would not have arrived, probably, in the afternoon of the 29th at Groveton, and would not have been able to support General Jackson on the evening of the 29th, and to make the great attack against our left wing on the next day, which attack resulted in the defeat of our army.
Question by the COURT. State particularly the points in which there was want of co-operation between your corps and that of General McDowell on the 29th of August on the march to Manassas. What did General McDowell omit to do which he ought to have done, and through which omission opportunity was lost to attack the left flank of the enemy; and in this connection state what forces of the enemy could have been so attacked, at what place, and with what results. State particularly.
Answer. When General McDowell's troops and my own were on the march to Manassas Jackson changed his position, and was on his march between Manassas and Gainesville. He therefore was not in order of battle, and presented us his left flank. If my corps and a division of General McDowell's would have attacked him he would not have been able to come so early to the point which he intended to reach-a point between Groveton, Centreville, and New Market; and, secondly, if my corps had not been ordered to march to Manassas, we would have been able to assist General King, or those troops which were attacked, on the evening of the 28th. By sending away my corps either of these opportunities were lost-first to attack the enemy, and second to assist the division under General King. I do not think it probable that they would have defeated the enemy, but we would not have liked to fight, and given an opportunity to the commander-in-chief to see clearly where was the enemy's position and to what points he should direct his troops.
Question by the COURT. On the 29th what particular disposition of the troops of your corps and General McDowell's did he omit, and which he could have made, so that the two corps would have acted in unity at Bull Run? What advantage would have resulted from such disposition?
Answer. From the letter of General Pope I supposed that the whole corps of General McDowell would attack the enemy on the right, and I would stay in front with my corps to check the enemy in his advance or to follow up advantages. Under this supposition I covered the whole front and extended my lines more that I would have done under other circumstances, to make the enemy believe we were very strong in front. The enemy directed his principal attack against our center and right wing, which was about 7,000 men strong. My left I had to cover by one division, as I did not know in the morning and up to 12 or 1 o'clock that General Reynolds was on my left. I could not make any disposition of the division of General Schenck to assist my right wing and the center, because he had to cover my left wing. I also did not re-
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