force also on the railroad. The care and protection of the road has been assigned to General Wool, so that I am foot-loose in that region.
I have directed General Cox, who has about 12,000 men in the Kanawha Valley, near Lewisburg, to maneuver so as to get Heth and Humphrey Marshall between himself and Lexington or Lynchburg, and then follow them through to Lexington by the turnpike by the turnpike, and open communication with Staunton or Charlottesville, abandoning entirely his line to Point Pleasant, on the Ohio, and calling in his small posts. Of course this movement will depend upon whether my operations toward Charlottesville and Richmond are carried out.
You position on James River places the whole of the enemy's force around Richmond between yourself and Washington. Were I to move with my command direct on Richmond I must fight the whole force of the enemy before I could join you, and at so great a distance from you as to be beyond any assistance from your army. If my command be embarked and sent to you by James River the enemy would be in Washington before it had half accomplished the journey.
Under these circumstances my position here is difficult and embarrassing. Whilst I am very anxious to render you all the assistance in my power, the imperative necessity of insuring the safety of the capital must control my operations.
You now know my position and resources. A movable force of 43,000 men (19,000 in good order), posted as I have detailed to you, are all I have, and I am made responsible for the security of this city.
I trust you will communicate you wishes to me, and give me the benefit of any views and suggestions which will enable me to aid you. I need not repeat that I stand prepared to do all in my power for that purpose.
I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH PROVISIONAL CORPS,
Harrison's Bar, July 4, 1862.
Brigadier General S. WILLIAMS,
Asst. Adjt. General, Headquarters Army of the Potomac:
GENERAL: I have the honor to present to the consideration of the commanding general this my recommendation that Brigadier General P. St. George Cooke be relieved from the command of the cavalry now serving with this army.
At the battle of the Chickahominy, on the 27th ultimo, I directed, in person, General Cooke to keep the cavalry below the hill in the valley, notifying him there was no use of cavalry on the hill, and I desired him to look to my left flank in the valley and not to come on the hill. Just at dusk, and as all my artillery was getting into action and driving the enemy from our front and checking pursuit of some disorganized forces, I was horrified to find cavalry charging through the batteries on my left and the men fleeing in terror. No efforts could stop them nor the artillery. The cavalry there caused the loss of this action and the abandonment of eight pieces of artillery.
I have since learned that General Cooke, after leading a portion (First and Fifth Cavalry and Lancers) of the cavalry under his command to attack immediately on the left of the batteries, left them in