June 28, 1862.
Honorable E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
Your dispatch and that of President received. Jackson is driving in my pickets, &c., on other side of the Chickahominy.
It is impossible to tell where re-enforcements ought to go, as I am yet unable to predict result of approaching battle. It will probably be better that they should go to Fort Monroe and thence according to state of affairs, when they arrive. It is not probable that I can maintain telegraphic communications more than an hour or two longer.
GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Washington, D. C., June 28, 1862.
Communication with McClellan by White House is cut off. Strain every nerve to open communication with him by James River, or any other way you can. Report to me.
WASHINGTON, D. C., June 28, 1862.
Enemy has cut McClellan's communication with White House and is driving Stoneman back on that point. Do what you can for him with gunboats at or near that place. McClellan's main force is between the Chickahominy and the James. Also do what you can to communicate with him and support him there.
FORT MONROE, June 28, 1862-3.30 p.m.
Honorable ABRAHAM LINCOLN:
I beg to acknowledge receipt of your telegram to-day. I knew of General McClellan's position last night, and sent up orders for gunboats to go up Chickahominy to protect the general's left flank and guard vessels with supplies. General Dix and myself will do everything in our power to communicate with General McClellan and to keep a communication with him open up the James River.
L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
WASHINGTON CITY, June 28, 1862.
I think you had better go with any re-enforcements you can spare to General McClellan.