to intrenching its own front, my division furnished the details for constructing the parapet with embrasures for one of the batteries of heavy guns.
I received information from the outposts of my division about 10 o'clock Wednesday night (the 21st) that there was a movement on foot by the enemy, and that he was apparently massing troops immediately in their front. I directed Brigadier-General Garfield to visit the outposts and, if possible, satisfy himself of the truth of the report. He returned about midnight satisfied of its general correctness. Supposing an attack early next morning was meditated, preparations were made in advance to meet it. From deserters who came into my outposts the following morning information was received that a very heavy force, estimated by common rumor in the rebel camp at 70,000, had been marched out the previous afternoon and night and that morning, commanded by General Bragg in person, to make a grand attack on our center. This attack was to be preceded by an attack on the right flank of our position. A demonstration on the right during the day, which failed, confirmed the statement of these deserters; and it was subsequently fully corroborated by other deserters from different regiments, who could have had no collusion in regard to their statements. Why the grand attack was not made on the center can never be certainly known, but it is reasonable to conjecture that it was the failure of the movement against the right of our general position. Having completed the task assigned to it in securing our intrenched camp, my division remained in position, quietly awaiting the moment for moving forward to the attack of the enemy in position. A week thus passed by, but that moment never came.
The early morning of the 30th was broken by the loud sound of singular and heavy explosions. The outposts of the most advanced divisions pushed forward to find that the enemy had evacuated his works around Corinth during the night of the 29th, and that the loud explosions arose from his attempt to destroy such of his material as he could not remove.
In concluding the report of the service rendered by my division in driving the enemy from a position which he had selected, as attested by the public press of the rebel States, as also by the official statement of the commander of the forces who lately occupied Corinth, in which to fight the great battle for the control of the Mississippi Valley, I would imperfectly and neglectfully perform the duty of division commander were I to omit to commend to the notice of our common superiors in rank the zeal, alacrity, patient obedience, and fortitude the troops displayed in the performance of every duty imposed on them in the brief but laborious campaign which terminated in giving to us that chosen position. No matter what the duty, whether in the toilsome march over muddy roads; the bivouac, with its attendant discomforts; the construction of channels of communication; the throwing up of intrenchments - a duty in which the spade, pick, and ax replaced the musket - or the resting on their arms both day and night, the same high qualities of the soldier were displayed.
My own thanks are specially due to my brigade commanders - General Garfield and Hascall and Colonel Wagner - and to Major Race, chief of artillery, for their valuable assistance, intelligent performance of duty, and prompt obedience throughout all the late operations.
In making up a report of operations in which all have behaved well it is always difficult, and often invidious, to signalize by name officers below the grade of the higher commanders, and only signal gallantry