my right. I could not find the Seventy-first Ohio Regiment, and had less than 800 men under my command. During the action we observed a battery planted southeast of us in a commanding position, to enfilade our line. It was, however, employed with little beyond threatening effect, the firing being too high. We had received no support on our right, as promised by General McArthur. We had emptied the cartridge boxes of the killed and wounded,and our ammunition was exhausted. Our fire was so slackened from this cause and our losses that I was apprehensive of a forward movement by the enemy, who could easily have overwhelmed us and thrown us into ruinous confusion. With the advice of Colonel Smith,of the Fifty-fourth Ohio, and Lieutenant-Colonel Malmborg, commanding the Fifty-fifth Illinois, I gave the order to fall back through the ravine nd reform on a hill to our right. I led the remnant of my brigade in good order to the point selected. When we reached it, the enemy had advanced on our left with their battery and were on a commanding position within 600 yards. They opened a fire of shell upon us, which compelled me to move on still farther, sheltering the command as well as possible by ravines and circuitous paths, till we reached a cavalry camp, where the brigade was reformed. On our way we were joined by a small remnant of the Seventy-first, under command of Adjutant Hart, of that regiment (some 17 or 18 men.) Finding I was beyond the line of the enemy,after consultation I ordered the brigade the brigade to march to the rear, toward the Landing, in preference to sending for ammunition, which I apprehended would not reach us. Within a quarter of a mile of the batteries the brigade was halted by an officer of General Grant's staff, who stated that ammunition was being sent back, and ordered that every fragment of regiments moving toward the Landing should be stopped.
Suffering from a wound I had received in my shoulder before the termination of our fight I turned the command over to Colonel T. Kilby Smith, of the Fifty-fourth Ohio, the next in rank, and proceeded to the Landing to learn the extent of my injury. Colonel Smith left the command to Lieutenant-Colonel Malmborg temporarily, while he returned to find and unite with the brigade the left wing of his regiment, which had become detached from us in their defense of our left flank, under Major Fisher. Meanwhile General Grant, passing, ordered Colonel Malmborg to form a line near the batteries. Major Fisher soon came in with his men and joined the line. Through Colonel Malmborg's efforts a line of over 3,000 men was formed, composed of remnants of regiments moving towards the Landing . Major Andrews of the Seventy-first, here came up with a portion of the left wing of his regiment, about 150 men, whom he had led to the bank of the Tennessee, where he hailed the gunboats, informing them of the approach of the enemy. So much of the brigade were in the last engagement near the batteries.
On Monday morning the brigade took the field, under the command of Colonel Smith. Its conduct was under the observation of the general himself. I was not able to do more than to make an effort to excite the enthusiasm of the men and lead them to the field when they were ordered forward into action. I turned the command over to Colonel Smith soon after. The experience of Sunday left me under no apprehension as to the fate of the brigade, if coolness, deliberation, and personal bravery could save it from loss or disgrace. Colonel Smith, from the beginning to the end of the engagement on Sunday, was constantly at his post, rallying, encouraging and fighting his men under incessant fire, regardless of personal safety.
I was under great obligations to Lieutenant-Colonel Malmborg, whose