cially Creeks against Creeks, but I had no alternative. When I was informed of Hopoeithlayohola's intentions to fight, I could do no more than request Colonel Drew and Colonel Cooper to march to the assistance of Colonel McIntosh; but my reluctance to send Indians against Indians was lessened by the sanguine hope that the presence of such a force would disperse the hostiles without a fight.
In May last I recommended the Government to send into the Indian country, under command of General McCulloch, three regiments of white troops, to be united to three regiments of Indians. It was palpable to me that we ought to give the Indians ocular evidence of our power and means to hold their country by he actual presence of a body of our own troops. I never thought of holding the country and repealing invasion from Kansas by an Indian force alone.
The force suggested by me was assigned to General McCulloch, but the intended neutrality of the Cherokees caused him to decline entering the Indian country; so that up to this time he has never had a soldier there, with the exception of two or three Texas regiment in transitu and Colonel Sims' regiment, now with Colonel Cooper.
The Creek and Choctaw regiments were raised in August and the Cherokee regiment in October; but it was a long time before Colonel Cooper's regiment was even partially armed. No arms were furnished the others; no pay was provided for any of them, and with the exception of a partial supply for the Choctaw regiment, no tents, clothing, or camp and garrison equipage were furnished to any of them.
Without any force of our own in the country I labored under great disadvantages in treating with the Indians and these caused great delay. The battle of Oak Hills had, however, a great effect, especially with the Cherokees; but it was at the same time unfortunate that even after that it was not in our power to place a force of our own troops in the Indian country.
I raised a company of Creeks, and placed it at the North Fork village to watch the movements of the discontented, and authorized the Seminole chief to raise a battalion of his people. I advised the Department and the quartermaster at Fort Smith of this, but no steps were ever taken to muster either into the service or to pay them.
I employed an escort of 64 men, which was discharged about the 20th of September, with over &2,000 due the men for pay. They still continue unpaid, Treasury notes having been sent out to pay them within the last two weeks.
I had incurred debts for the Government to traders and individual Indians, and my drafts in their favor on the Government were protested and remained unpaid until after I left the Indian country. At Fort Smith I received &20,000 in Treasury notes, and had either to remain there an indefinite time in order to take up the drafts or deposit the money at my own risk with an individual to pay them. Of course I elected the latter. I do not mention these circumstances by way of complaint or fault-finding, but that the Secretary of War may comprehend the reasons that have gone so far to produce not only discontent, but suspicion and mistrust, among the Indians. Added to the unavoidable delay in completing the treaties and the additional delay in procuring their ratification and the transmission of the moneys due under the treaties, the circumstances that I have mentioned have not unnaturally produced the impression that what I have done amounts to nothing; that the Government does not sanction what I have done, and that it has not the men or the means to hold the Indian country.
Emissaries from Kansas have been among the Indians since the trea-