This command will proceed to Russellville, the infantry and its baggage by rail and the artillery guns, the cavalry and artillery horses marching together.
General Floyd will receive all information you have in relation to the enemy on Green River; be instructed to protect our line from this point by rail to Clarksville.
He must judge from after information whether he shall march straight upon the enemy, now reported at South Carrollton, or wait for further developments of his intention.
It is sufficient to say he must get the best information of the movements of the enemy southward from the river, and beat them at the earliest possible opportunity.
W. W. MACKALL,
Camp Beauregard, January 21, 1862-7 o'clock.
Commanding C. S. Army, Western Department:
GENERAL: The accompanying dispatches* you will read with painful interest. My command is mostly in; but few of our wagons have arrived. We are now here for the winter, as the roads are almost impassable. Our arrangements should be made accordingly. Can nothing, general, be done to stop the invader? It will be a dark when the soil of Tennessee is polluted by his footstep. O, for a brigade now here to fall upon him! My command is distressingly small, as our late scouting and moving through sleet, snow, and ice has sickened men and crippled unshod horses.
I will do what I can to harass and cripple the enemy. Cannot two good regiments of infantry be called from below somewhere and placed here under a practical, judicious brigade officer? With them and the advantage of the roads and season (which is equal to two regiments) we can stop the ruthless invader. You must devise, and subordinates execute. I will keep you constantly advised of the movements of the enemy and will try to do my duty.
Yours, most respectfully,
J. H. MILLER,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Post.
P. S.-I have no pen, ink, or envelopes. Please send the post-boy
CLARKSVILLE, January 21, 1862.
Major General W. J. HARDEE, Bowling Green:
MY DEAR SIR: Our forts are still in an unfinished condition, and will remain so, unless the 2,000 men who are now here are ordered to work on them immediately; if necessary, night and day. As yet no work has been done by the soldiers, and if half we h ear is true we have no time to lose. There is a great deal of work done on the forts, but they are unfinished, and in the present condition do no earthly good, and are no more effective for defense than if they were in their original condition before a spade of dirt was removed. More energy must be infused into the work of preparation here for defense, or we