transportation train of 140 wagons, but give no account of any artillery. They say that Zollicoffer is with them, which I think probable, as they have not had that number of troops anywhere below this.
If you could send me Hewett's battery to this place, and send in below their crossing at Greasy Creek about six regiments, among the number Wolford's, we might be able to over come them; at all events we would like to have sufficient to make show of resistance at this point.
Please let me know by bearer whether we can hope for any assistance from above, and, if so, what amount, and how soon they will probably be up.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. A. HOSKINS,
Colonel, Commanding Post.
CAMP JERRY BOYLE, November 28, 1861.
(Received November 29, 21861.)
GENERAL: There is no doubt that Zollicoffer, with 8,000 men, is in Clinton and Wayne, the advance being close [to] the Cumberland River. They will cross the river a short time and take Somerset, and go on to Danville or Crab Orchard, if not prevented. They are at this time constructions boat to cross the river on. There's doubt but that the enemy are advancing from Bowling Green; they are at this time, which strong pickets, in 20 miles of this place. The enemy can be whipped at Cumberland River if a course is immediately sent there. Excess me for urging sufficient force being sent forward to whip them at once.
WASHINGTON, November 29, 1861.
Your letter received. I fully approve of your course and agree in your views.
WASHINGTON, monday night [November 29, 1861.]
Brigadier General D. C. BUELL, Louisville:
MY DEAR BUELL: Your welcome letter of the 27th [of November, 1861] reached me this evening. I have just telegraphed you, expressing my satisfaction at its contents. I now feel sure that I have a "lieutenant" in whom I can fully rely. Your views are right. You have seized the true strategic base, and from Lebanon can move where you will. Keep up the hearts of the Tennessee. Make them feel that, far from any intention of deserting them, all will be done to sustain them. Be sure to maintain their ardor, for it will avail you much in the future. I am not, as a general rule, at all disposed to scatter troops. I believe in attacks by concentrated masses, but it seems to me, with the little local knowledge I possess, that you might attempt two movements, one on Eastern Tennessee, say with 15,000 men, and a strong attack on Nashville, as you propose, with, say, 50,000 men.
I think we own it to our Union friends in Eastern Tennessee to protect them at all hazards. First, secure that; then, if you possess the means, carry Nashville.