promptly as possible with Hardee's division and Texas cavalry. Stanton's regiment, from Overton County, was also ordered to that place, but in consequence of depredations of Home Guards had to be sent back to repress them. Another regiment was also ordered to Bowling Green, but, as now remembered, was not carried forward because ot was unarmed and there were no arms to give them. The more rapid advance of the enemy had been checked by burning the bridge over Rolling Fork.
Answer 4th. I have heard General Johnston assign many reasons for not ordering General Buckner to advance in the first instance to Muldraugh's Hill. He regarded that position as unsuited for a base of military operations and as possessing but slightly strategic importance. It was beyond the Green River, the navigability of which had to be destroyed to prevent the enemy from moving by water from Paducah, Cairo, and other points in Buckner's rear. With that navigable stream open, they could transport upon it not only troops, but the heaviest ordnance and other munitions of war, and effectually cut Buckner's line of communication with Tennessee and the South, whence his supplies of men and munitions must be drawn. Buckner's force was small (about 4,000); his troops were fresh, most of them illy armed and many illy disciplined; their general appointments for a campaign defective; and, being wholly without transportation, they would have been tied down to the railroad.
the line of Barren River, however, on which Bowling Green is, he regarded as a good base of operations, the advance column occupying the country to the Green River, and Bowling Green being in supporting distance from Tennessee, from and through which supplies and re-enforcements must come if unexpectedly the Kentuckians failed to rush to Buckner's standard at his approach. He regarded it as necessary to hold Bowling Green, not only till the navigability of the Green River was destroyed, but to make it a depot of supplies. He also thought it should be fortified, that it might be garrisoned and held by as small a force as possible, to increase thereby the numbers for the field. If a superior force should advance on that position by being fortified, compensation would be had for disparity of numbers.
Answer 5th. As nearly as I can ascertain, between 3,000 and 4,000, the balance of his force being distributed along the turnpike on the march to Nashville.
General Johnston had ordered on Friday, before the conflicts at Donelson, that preparations be made to evacuate Bowling Green. The army began the march on Tuesday, and the troops remaining were engaged in removing Governments stores by the railroad. They were under the commanding of Brigadier-General Hindman, and detained for that purpose.
Answer 6th. For the troops along the turnpike, none. They would have been compelled to march. For those at Bowling Green, who were still engaged in removing the stores, the engines and cars on hand; what number of either I do not know. The railroad runs to Clarksville; steamers thence to Donelson.
Answer 7th. See Numbers 5.
Answer 8th. I do not know nor have I the means of ascertaining.
Answers 9th and 10th. I do not believe re-enformcements were asked of General Johnston by either General Floyd, Pillow, or Buckner, or any other commander there during those conflicts. I had access to the dispatches; think I read every one. I never saw such a request, except when I heard it reported in Richmond that General Johnston had been asked by the generals at Donelson. I thought it a mistake then, and as