tion long against such overwhelming numbers, particularly as they were then enabled to completely invest us and cut off our communication by river. It was then impossible to get re-enforcements from Bowling Green or elsewhere in time to relieve us. It required three days, by railroad and river, for the forces which did come to get there, owing to the shortness of transportation.
I apprised General Johnston of the arrival of the enemy's large re-enforcements, giving him every arrival; but I had just come from Bowling Green, and was of opinion that the force reserved for that position was inadequate for its defense against a large assaulting force, and I knew General Johnston could not give me any re-enforcements unless he abandoned that place; a measure which I did no consider it my province to suggest. Knowing this, I felt it my duty to make the best possible defense with the forces we had. We had one additional regiments or battalion there, which General Floyd sent to Cumberland City to protect public stores that had been forwarded to that place. These are the reasons why no application was made for re-enforcements.
2nd. In response to the second point made by the Secretary's order, I have to say that arrangements were all made, orders given to the whole command to evacuate the works, and troops were under arms to march out, when information was received that we were invested. up to this time the general officers were all agreed upon the the line of action necessary and proper under the circumstances. (See supplemental report.) It was as to the necessity of a change of policy in the new state of the case that a difference of opinion arose between the general officers. I was for cutting our way out. Generals Floyd and Buckner thought surrender was a necessity of the position of the army.
In response to the point made by the Secretary's order, that it was not satisfactorily explained how a part of the command was withdrawn and the balance surrendered, I have to say:
On the evening and night of February 15, after the battle, in expectation of evacuating the place that night, General Floyd has sent off every steamboat we had, with the prisoners and our sick and wounded. As mattes turned out this was most unfortunate; but I did not perceive that the act could be censured for it was a measure preparatory to evacuation, and no ene could have foreseen the course of events which late that the act could be censured for it was a measure preparatory to evacuation, and no one could have foreseen the course of events which late that night defeated that measure. The act, however, was that of my senior officer, and I was not even consulted about its propriety.
When we ascertained, between 3 and 4 o'clock that night, that we were reinvested, and question of our position became one of vital interest to the commanding officers, we had not a single boat, neither skiff, yawl, nor even flat or other ferry boat. There was no means of crossing the river. The river was full and the weather intensely cold.
About daybreak the steamer General Anderson and one other little boat came down. One of the boats had on board about 400 raw troops. I had then crossed the river in a small hand flat, about 4 feet wide by 12 long, which Mr. Rice, a citizen of Dover (acting as my volunteer aide-de-camp), had, by some means, brought over from the opposite side of the river.
Upon the arrival of these steamers General Floyd, acting, I presume, under the agreement between himself and General Buckner before the command was turned over, crossed over to the opposite shore as many of his troops as he could, until he was directed by General Buckner's staff officer to leave, as the gunboats of the enemy were approaching. This information was given me by General Gloyd when we met at Clarksville. My horses were brought across the river on one of the