a great many of the men already frost-bitten, and it was the opinion of the generals that the infantry could not have passed through the water and have survived it.
N. B. FORREST,
Colonel, Commanding Forrest's Regiment of Cavalry.
Sworn to and subscribed before me on the 15th day of March, 1862.
Intendant of the Town of Decatur, Ala., and ex-officio Justice of the Peace.
[Inclosure Numbers 4.]
Statement of Major Gus. A. Henry.
DECATUR, ALA., March 13, 1862.
On the morning of February 16 I was present during the council of war, held in Brigadier-General Pillow's headquarters, at Dover, Tenn., Generals Floyd, Pillow, Buckner, and General Pillow's staff being present. On account of being very much exhausted from the fight of the 15th instant I slept the forepart of the night, and came down-stairs from my room into General Pillow's about 1 or 2 o'clock. At the time I entered General Pillow's room it had been decided that we should fight our way out, and General Pillow gave me orders ot gather up all the papers and books belonging to my department; whereupon I immediately executed the orders give to me, and then returned to General Pillow's, to ascertain whether the enemy had been decided upon, on account of information received from scouts, ordered out by General Pillow, to ascertain whether the enemy had reoccupied the ground they that the enemy had swung entirely around, and were in possession of the very same scouts, who made a thorough reconnaissance, and reported that the woods were perfectly alive with troops, and that their camp-fires were burning in every direction.
General Pillow then sent a party of cavalry to inspect a slough that was filled with backwater from the river, to see if infantry could pass. They returned, after having made a thorough examination on horseback and on foot, and reported that infantry could not pass, but they thought cavalry could.
Communication being thus cut off, General Pillow urged the propriety of making a desperate attempt to cut our was out, whatever might be the consequences, or make a fight in the work and a hold our position one more day, by which time we could get steamboats sufficient to put the whole command over the river and make our escape by the way of Clarksville.
General Buckner then said that, in consequence of the worn-out condition and demoralization of the troops under his command, and the occupation of his rifle pits on his extreme right by the enemy, he could not hold his position a half hour after being attacked, which he thought would begin about daylight.
General Pillow then said that by the enemy's occupation of the rifle pits on General Buckner's right it was an open gateway to our river battery, and that he thought we ought to cut our way thorough, carrying with us as many as possible, leaving the killed and wounded on the field.
General Buckner then said that it would cost three-fourths of the