the outworks around it, together with the advanced state of the new works south of Tennessee River, Fort Heiman, together with its line of outworks, of rifle pits, and abatis, was all thoroughly performed, and satisfies my own mind that officers and men could not have fallen short in their duties to have accomplished so much.
The failure of adequate support, doubtless from sufficient cause, cast me upon my own resources, and compelled me to assure responsibilities which may have worked a partial evil. I aimed at the general good, and am the last man to shrink from assuming what is most likely to accomplish such an end.
I would further state that I had connected both Forts Henry and Donelson by a line of telegraph from Cumberland City-total length of line about 35 miles-thus placing me in close relations with Bowling Green and Columbus.
Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.
No. 9. Report of Lieutenant Colonel Milton A. Haynes, C. S. Army, Chief of Tennessee Corps of Artillery.
RICHMOND, VA., March 22, 1862.
SIR: By direction of the honorable Secretary of War I have the honor to submit a report in regard to the defense and surrender of Fort Henry, February 6
On January 15, Major-General Polk, by his order, a copy of which I annex,* commanded me to proceed to Forts Henry and Donelson and take charge of the artillery forces in General Tilghman's division. Having been charged by General Tilghman with certain duties at Fort Donelson, on the night of February 5 I proceeded, attended only by my servant, to Fort Henry, but did not enter the fort until after daylight, not being able to cross the backwaters in the night. I then learned, for the first time, that the enemy had landed about 10,000 or 12,000 men at Bailey's Landing, 3 miles beyond the fort, on the same side of the river, and that ten gunboats and several transports were lying at the same point.
After hastily examining the works with Captain Hayden, of the Engineers, I gave it as my opinion that Fort Henry was untenable, and ought to be forthwith abandoned, first, because it was surrounded by water, then cut off from the support of the infantry, and was on the point of being submerged; second, because our whole force, artillery, cavalry, and infantry, amounted to little over 2,000 men, a force wholly inadequate to cope with that of the enemy, even if there had been no extraordinary rise in the river.
About 8 o'clock General Tilghman, who was on my arrival at Fort Heiman [the new but unfinished work on the opposite side of the river], came across to Fort Henry. I had a brief interview with him in regard to the steps to be taken at Fort Donelson, but, it becoming evident that the enemy would attack on that day, further consultation was postponed, and General Tilghman proceeded at once, without consultation with me, to make his disposition for the defense of Fort Henry. He
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