designated in the ninety-sixth article of war, and in that specification naval officer are not mentioned. It should also be observed that the Articles of War are acts of Congress, declared to be for the government of the armies of the Confederate States. If, however, this court, composed exclusively of army officers, can go beyond these limits to hear testimony impeaching the official conduct of naval officers and pronounce judgment upon such conduct, the solecism in law and justice is presented of men being tried without notice and condemned without a hearing. Such a construction of the order convening this court is less to be justified when it is borne in mind that officers of the Navy belong to another and different arm of the service, and are responsible by law to a separate and distinct Department, clothed with full power and every facility to ascertain and punish its own delinquents. Again, such a course is not necessary to determine whether or not General Lovell has discharged the duties devolved upon him, nor does he ask it to be taken. he was directed by the President to concert and co-operate with the naval officers on duty in his department. If he obeyed this direction and was faithful to his other well-known trusts he should be acquitted of blame. The President and the secretary of war also informed him that he had no control over officers of the Navy, which fact of course exempts him from all responsibility for their acts or failure to act. It is admitted that the witness amy testify that General Lovell sought the co-operation of naval men and suggested certain measures for their adoption, and that this co-operation was refused and the proposed measures designated. To be more specific, to may be shown, and the court may report, if proven, that the Louisiana was not placed in the position desired by General Lovell, and that Commander Mitchell did to make such use of the fire rafts and guard boats as he had been requested and had promised to make. Should such facts appear in the report of the court, the basis of future action is furnished to the Government. It is submitted the this line of procedure is in accordance with the law, the requirements of the order, and substantial justice. The court does that which all courts of inquiry are designed to do; it enables the Government to determined whether or not further proceedings shall be had. A different course tends to excite strife and contention, arraying one arm of the service against the other when the public defense demands unity of spirit and action.
The court, however, declined to make the direction, as requested by the judge-advocate, for reasons set forth in the following opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT.
On the 16th instant, with the view to remove all doubt upon the point raised by the judge-advocate, a telegram was sent by the order of this court to the Adjutant-General at Richmond, asking specific instruction inthe premises. No reply has been received. It therefore remains for the court to act upon its own judgment. The order convening the court does not restrict its investigations to the conduct of Major General Mansfield Lovell and the troops of his command except as to the mere evacuation of New Orleans. In relation to the capture of the city the works of the order preclude the idea of such restriction, and they do not imply it in respect to the examine into the attending facts and circumstances, without any limit as to persons or arm of the service. If a partial examination were intended, that intention would doubtless have been expressed. It is the