Lovell assumed command we had about 18,000 or 20,000 pounds of powder, some of which was worthless, and was sent to New Orleans and reworked. This supply was trebled by him.
The court adjourned to meet at 10 a. m. the 24th instant.
APRIL 24, 1863-10 a. m.
The court met pursuant to adjournment.
Present, all the members of the court, the judge-advocate, and Major General Mansfield Lovell.
The proceedings of yesterday were read over.
Colonel EDWARD HIGGINS was then sworn and examined as a witness.
By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
Question. When did you first enter the service of the Confederate States? State your rank at that time; your present rank; where and t what duty you have been assigned from date of your entry into service.
Answer. I think I entered the service in April, 1861, as captain of the First Louisiana Artillery. I served as aide-de-camp to General Twiggs during his command of New Orleans. After this general was relieved I was placed in command of a light battery. About this time I resigned and remained out of service for about a month, when I was reappointed lieutenant-colonel of the Twenty-second Regiment Louisiana Volunteers. My first duty as lieutenant-colonel was, in obedience to orders from General Lovell, to save the raft between Forts Saint Philip and Jackson. I was assigned by General Duncan to the command of those forts. I was engaged upon this raft about two weeks with all the force that could be possibly had; it was a tremendous job.
Question. Were you in the service of the United State before the secession of the South? If so, in what capacity and for what length of time?
Answer. I was in the Navy of the United States from 1836 to 1854, when I resigned, a lieutenant. The last two yards of my service under that Government was spent in commanding and ocean steamer, in which command I remained four years after leaving the United States service.
Question. State generally your knowledge of the causes of the fall of New Orleans, and whether or not the same might have been prevented by Major-General Lovell with the means at his disposal.
The judge-advocate, being told infirmly by the witness that the inefficiency and incompetency of the naval officers in command at or near Forts Jackson and Saint Philip was the principal cause of the fall of New Orleans, here asked the court to direct the witness to exclude from his reply to the foregoing question the expression of any opinion touching the efficiency or inefficiency of the officers of the C. S. Navy, because the court has no jurisdiction to inquire into and pronounce an opinion upon the official conduct of such officers.
In support of this proposition the judge-advocate submitted the following.
The ninety-first article of war, by which courts of inquiry are authorized, declares that they are "to examined into the nature of any transaction, accusation, or imputation against an officer or soldier." Their jurisdiction, both as to subject-matter and person, is thus clearly defined. The person must be an officer or soldier or the accusation that may be made against him; but, as if to remove all doubt or uncertainty as to parties within the jurisdiction of army courts, their character is specifically