made by land, and I felt sure that the enemy was well posted as to the strength of our works.
With regard to the water approaches, I had put every gun in position that I could get and had obstructed every river of any size leading into the department, relying upon the Navy to have such iron-clad ships and other gunboats as would enable us to oppose successfully every attack by water.
I desire to state that there were two separate and distinct organizations for the defense of Department Numbers 1, viz, that under the control of the Secretary of War, of which I was the senior officer, and that under the Secretary of the Navy, of which Commodore Hollins and afterwards Commander Whittle were the seniors. We were entirely independent of each other, but were directed to co-operate cordially for the defense of the city. I had no control whatever over them, but the best feeling existed, and there was very seldom any difference of opinion between us as to what should be and there was very send any difference of opinion between us as to what should be done. I made requests at various times of them that they were unable to comply with. They complained
frequently of the inadequacy of the means and material placed at their disposal to assist me, and regretted that they had no power to hasten the completion of the proper ship for our defense. What few they had were sent up the rivers, and the others were directed to follow as soon as completed. Against this I protested by telegram on April 11 to to the Secretary of War. (See dispatches, hereunto appended, marked document Numbers 13.) These vessel, however, were never entirely finished. On land we had, for the defense of the department, sixteen different forts, large and small (seven of which were build before the war), upon the various water approaches, besides an entrenched line, with numerous batteries, around the city, in all of which there were in position nearly 300 guns of various calibers, while on April 24 there was not a single war vessel of any great size or power afloat on the Mississippi River in serviceable condition for the defense of Department Numbers 1.
There was an additional part of my administration of affairs which cost much time and labor.
On March 15, 1862, by direction of the President, New Orleans and the adjacent parishes were placed under martial law. Eight provost-marshals were appointed, four for the city and four for the parishes,and for valid reasons I felt compelled to give a good deal of time and attention personally to their plans and course of action.
In the latter part of February the great raft in the Mississippi River began to show signs of giving way. The drift had accumulated greatly and the river was higher than ever known before. I employed steamboats and skiffs to remove the drift, but it gained on us so rapidly that the attempt was given up. The raft gave way at various points, and by the end of the first week in March the main chains snapped, and it ceased to be any longer an obstruction. I determined, therefore, to detain six of Montgomery's boats at New Orleans, contrary to orders from the War Department, but reported the fact and the reasons therefor on March 10 by letter to the Secretary of War.
Previous to taking command at New Orleans I had verbally stated, both to the President and Secretary of War, that, in my opinion, batteries on shore could be passed by ships of war under steam with the loss of but few vessels, and had repeated this opinion to the latter in my letter of November 19, 1861.
As soon as the raft had given way I applied for and got $100,000 from the city council of New Orleans, by whom the money for the previous raft had been furnished, and sent Colonel Higgins, an able an deficient officer, formerly of the U. S. Navy, down, to endeavor to repair the raft. I gave him full authority to take or hire steamers, employ men, and do anything that might be necessary to accomplish his purpose. It was found impossible to restore the raft; but a new obstructions was made of parts of the old raft and with schooners anchored and fastened together by chains. This obstruction was, however, far inferior to the other, and was by no means satisfactory; but heavy chains for anchoring a more formidable obstruction could not be obtained by the most strenuous endeavors. I had prepared an sent down forty or fifty fire rafts loaded with light wood and mixed with cotton, rosin, and tar oil, which were placed above and below the new obstruction. This second obstruction was pretty placed above and below the new obstruction. This second obstruction was pretty much broken up and carried away before the final attack. I also sent to Memphis and procured the services of Mr. J. B. Cook, who had much experience with torpedoes, and endeavored to have them placed in the river; but the great depth (more than 130 feet) and the powerful current rendered such attempts nugatory. I ordered a Drummond light to be made and sent to Fort Jackson; but it was destroyed by one of the enemy's shells during the bombardment.
Governor Moore, at my request, took two steamers, lying in the river, had them strengthened with cotton bales and provided with officers and crews, which he placed under my orders. I armed them with two heavy guns each and furnished them with ammunition, &c., and sent them to Fort Jackson, under Captains Kennon and Grant.
The arrangements for casting heavy guns were meanwhile pressed forward under my frequent supervision, but many difficulties presented themselves. Pits for casting could not be used on account of water, which in that low, flat country rapidly filled