on the batteries adjacent to the navy-yard, those of Battery Scott to Fort McRae and the light-house batteries, and those of the fort to all. We reduced very perceptibly the fire of Barrancas, entirely silenced that in the navy-yard and in one or two of the other batteries, the efficiency of our fire at the close of the day not being the least impaired.
The next morning I again opened about the same hour, the Navy, unfortunately (owing to a reduction in the depth of water, caused by a change of wind), not being able tog et so near as yesterday, consequently the distance was too great to be effectual. My fire this day was less rapid and, I think, move efficient than that of yesterday. Fort McRee, so effectually silenced yesterday, did not fire again to-day. We silenced entirely one or two guns, and had one of ours disabled by a shot coming through the embrasure. About 3 o'clock fire was communicated to one of the houses in Warrington, and shortly after to the Churchsteeple. The church and the whole village being immediately in rear of some of the rebel batteries (they apparently having placed them purposely directly in front of the largest and most valuable building), the fire rapidly communicated to other building along the street, until probably two-thirds of it was consumed, and about the same time fire was discovered issuing from the back part of the navy-yard, probably in Woolsey, a village to the north and immediately adjoining the yard, as Warrington does on the west. Finally it penetrated to the yard, and, as it continued to burn brightly all night, I concluded that either in it or in Woolsey many building were destroyed. Very heavy damage was also done to the buildings of the yard by the avalanche of shot, shell, and splinter showered unceasingly on them for two days, and as they were nearly fire-proof (being built of brick and covered with slate), I could not succeeding firing them, nighter my hot shot nor shells having any power of igniting them. The steamer Time, which was at the wharf at the time, was abandoned on the first day and exposed to our fire, which probably entirely disabled her.
The fire was again continued until dark, and with mortars occasionally, until 2 o'clock the next morning, when the combat ceased. This fort at its conclusion, though it has received a great many shot and shell, is in very respect, save the disabling of one gun-carriage and the loss of service of 6 men, as efficient s it was at the commencement of the coat, but the ends I proposed in commencing having been attained, except one, which I find to be impracticable with my present means, I do not deem it advisable further to continue it, unless the enemy thinks proper to do so, when I shall meet him with alacrity. The attack on "Billy Wilson's" camp, the attempted attack on my batteries, and the insult to our glorious flag have been fully and fearfully avenged. I have no means of knowing the loss of the enemy, and have no disposition to guess at it. The firing on his batteries was very heavy, well-directed, and continuous for two days, and could hardly fail of having had important results. Our losses would have been heavy but for the foresight which, with great labor, caused us to erect elaborate means of protection, and which saved many lives. I lost 1 private killed, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and 4 privates wounded, only 1 severely. My officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates were everything I could desire. They one and all performed their duty with the greatest cheerfulness and in the most able and efficient manner.
I am much indebted to Major-General Arnold, my executive officer, for his valuable assistance. His whole conduct was admirable, and Captains Allen, Chalfin, Blunt, Robertson, Hildt, and Duryea, and Lieutenants