point, leave my camp, thrown my reserves behind Powell's Run, put forward skirmishers to harass and delay the enemy all along the Telegraph road by ambuscades and bush fighting, and place a small force in the breast-works on the south side of nebsco. This will cause him to halt, reconnoiter, cannonade, deploy, and attack, and I shall cause him to venture into the open country between Keankey's and Powell's crossings, and make my stand along Powell's Run, in the dense woods and heights, which there are in our advantage, as on Neabsco they are his.
From the nature of the county I design to make it an infantry fight, depriving him of the advantage of his artillery for which the ground is rather favorable to him at Kankey's, while I have but few pieces. I f he designs to put flank me, he can only do it a on and hazardous march by Green wood Church or, by chance, by the position marched for the Sixth North Carolina. Perhaps I would not do this had I force enough to occupy Greenwood, Stonnel's and kankey's. Behind Powell's the country is all in my favor and against him, and he cannot make the roundabout march without risking a defeat at Powell's Run, or at any state a certainly of my knowing his flank movement and meeting it be moving French's lower regiments on the Dumfries and Bacon Run road.
If he comes in very heavy force, say enough to justify you in moving to attack him, I shall not hesitate a moment to sacrifice the blockaded of the river-that is, the Evansport batteries-to securing the entire annihilation of his force, which, if he moves as indicated, would be surely accomplished by your coming by Bacon Run and Stafford and cutting off all retreat. All I would have to do would be to hold him, and to do this I should not hesitate to call up French's force, leaving but a few show on the river. If sufficient re-enforcements arrive, why I may try and make battle on my own hook. Otherwise my course must be as stated, since by that I concentrate on what will by probably his main attack by the Telegraph road and prevent the charge of being cut in two. You gave me on answer about Marshall.
W. H. WHITING,
CAMP LEE. WESTMORELAND COUNTRY,
November 30, 1861.
DEAR COLONEL: * * * I think I discover many slight indications of disaffection to our cause in this section, and full credence to what I hear would render me really very uneasy. The deprivation of salt, sugar, and coffee is severely felt by the poor. Contact with the North in trade had to some extent rendered many very lukewarm, some hostile to slavery, and demagogues if not emissaries represent the war as on for the rich. The obvious importance to the North of securing possession of the south bank of the Potomac, even int he contingency of treating for the acknowledgement of the independence of the Confederate States, would justify strenuous efforts to win over those peopled, and the almost unrestricted ingress and egress from Maryland affords every facility to tamper with and mislead them. The opinion is expressed that the landing of the enemy would witness the raising of the Union flag now, and on officer in the militia, I hear, thinks over half of his company, if they did not openly take sides with, would at least refuse to fight the Yankees. I do not believe this, yet the knowledge that such belief is entertained by intelligent gentleman, and the fact that for