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[Image 1: Photo
courtesy of BGen
J Herbert, USA
(Ret). Orote
Point, a former airfield, was the most isolated and most secure
of the camps.
When repatriates
threatened violence,
Capt Howard P.
Shores III reminded them of Orote Point.]

Page 225(The Bitter End)

camps under Navy jurisdiction to Military Support Officer, New Life Guam, effective
l August. His new mission responsibilities entailed coordinating with the
Senior Civil Coordinator to provide necessary administrative, logistical,
and operational support for the internal camp functioning. He also provided
guidance to the Marines who were carrying out these functions. Colonel McCain
insured above all else that they avoided law enforcement activities in the
camps, maintaining as minimal a military presence as possible.

Just prior to Colonel McCain's redesignation. Rear Admiral Kent J. Carroll replaced Admiral Morrison as Commander, Naval Forces, Marianas (ComNavMar) and overall military coordinator for refugee operations. At about the same time, the newly designated Senior Civil Coordinator arrived. Julia Taft, the Director of the Inieragency Task Force (IATF) for Indochina Refugees. had appointed retired Army Brigadier General James A. Herbert to head a team of representatives responsible for coordinating the processing and preparation of refugees for shipment to the United States. The Senior Civil Coordinator and the Military Support Officer soon would work closely together in solving the "repatriate" problem and bringing to a close the refugee operation on Guam.44

Colonel McCain's redesignation reflected the changing complexion of the camps' population. As each new group of refugees boarded a flight for the continental United Stares, the percentage of those remaining who desired to return to Vietnam increased. Known as "repatriates," the potential danger they represented, and their alarming threats, grew as they approached a majority* As this problem intensified, the Marines had to take oven action to stem the growing threat of violence. Captain Howard P. Shores 111, the commander of Camp Socio, before taking control of what later became the Socio repatriate camp, received only one instruction, "insure that the camp functions."45

To accomplish this security mission. Captain Shores had no choice but to deal directly with the leader of the repatriates. Colonel Quay (political leader) and his assistants, Captain Tarn (political second in command) and Major Hai (administrative leader). Upon their initial meeting. Colonel Quay stated his position: "The only thing we want is to be able to repatriate to Vietnam and we will do anything including

�Recently. General Herbert explained the origin of (he rcpairi-ales and the
extent of the problem: "VNN ships were evacuated with crews. The crews never
contacted (heir families, who remained in Vietnam. The same was true of some
VNAF aircraft (C-130s which were flown to Thailand) crews whose families were
in SVN. There were families sent out in the refugee stream whose (husbands)
did not make it and were in SVN. Most of the repatriation group wished for family
reunification, regardless of the cost. All of those who expressed a desire to
leave were moved to Camp Asan. as other camps were closed out." General Herbert's
task upon arriving in early August as the newly designated Senior Civil Coordinator "was
to resettle about 6.000 refugees remaining on Guam, to assemble repatriates
from Eglin, Indiantown, Chaffcc, and Pendleton on Guam and care for them there
until the 'repatriate problem' was solved." Herbert Comments.

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