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able but that it had "probably made some sort of a deal with the Air Force
and in all probability go 'agin' us." They had no doubt what General
McConnell's stance would be. General McCutcheon also assumed that the
chairman. General Wheeler, "was locked in concrete against us." Actually
the meeting resolved little. General McConnell suggested that no vote
on the subject be made until the return of General Wheeler. General
Chapman agreed and observed that he would "get McCutcheon to pitch to
him [Wheeler] as soon as I can corner him." According to General McCutcheon,
the "die has been cast, we are on record in the JCS and the Commandant
will continue the fight."35

Point, Counterpoint

Although touching upon several themes including legal and doctrinal aspects, the "strongest single factor" of the Marine Corps argument against the single manager system was responsiveness. According to Major General McCutcheon, "there isn't any doubt about it char when you add more layers to the system it is bound to take more time. We are making a big-to-do about this." On 26 March, he observed to both Generals E. E. and Norman Anderson that it "was absolutely necessary" that they record "in great detail what [air] you put in for, and when, and what you actually get and when." The Commandant reinforced this request in a formal message to General Krulak, remarking that Marine commanders needed to keep derailed records: "We need an audit trail that will stand up under any scrutiny."36

Major General Anderson needed little encouragement. On 27 March, he
began a daily summary on a statistical and narrative account of the
workings of the single manager system. This was in addition to the weekly
reports chat he already had submitted to both FMFPac and Headquarters,
Marine Corps. In early April, General Anderson began to draft for General
Cushman an evaluarion of the single manager system. He reviewed the
workings of the system for the last three weeks of March. The Marine
general observed that neither I DASC nor DASC Victor was ready to operate
when they claimed they were up and running. According to the Marine
command, "Facilities were not ready, and personnel not assigned, and
no chance to test communication and equipment."37*

* Different Marine aviation tactical commanders had different impressions
about the single manager imbroglio at the time. Brigadier General Harry
T. Hagaman, who as a lieutenant colonel commanded VMFA-323 from January
into May 1968, recalled that he was, "acutely aware of the Air Force
effort to single manage Marine air in l Corps." He stated that during
this period, the first wing "directed MAG-12, MAG-13, and MAG-11 to
document all delays and frequency changes that we were required to make
when working with Air Force controllers." General Hagaman remembered
that in the second part of March when single manager went into effect,
"there were some delays in getting 'on target' because of the increased
communication requirement." BGen Harry T.

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