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Department ot Defense (USMC) Photo A422857

Marines of the 1st LAAM (Light Antiaircraft Missile)
Battalion talk (in the radio next to their HAWK surface-to-air guided
missiles at the missile site overlooking the Da Nang Airbase from the
west.

observed that, "moreover, there were generally sufficient preplanned
missions canceled after launch to provide a 'divert pool' from which
aircraft could be assigned to immediate requests."28 The
TADC could also launch strikes from any of the three "hot pads." Each
of the fixed-wing groups usually kept four aircraft on strip alert.
Completely fueled and armed with an assortment of ordnance, these planes
usually would be airborne under 10 minutes from receipt of the initial
request. Other aircraft would immediately take their place on the hot
pad. In the event of an intense combat situation, the wing would prebrief
pilots and then send them aloft in aircraft on airborne alert. It circumstances
dictated the wing could also call upon the Seventh Air Force and even
Seventh Fleet fixed-wing attack aircraft for assistance.29

For the most part. Marine air flew about 80 percent of its missions
in support of the two Marine divisions. The wing gave the remaining
20 percent ro the Seventh Air Force. Up to this point. Marine air normally
did not support Army units except upon request of the Seventh Air Force.
The Korean Marines, however, came directly to the wing which in part
was the reason for maintaining the Marine DASC at Chu Lai. Major General
Norman Anderson remembered several years later char the Army's Task
Force Oregon, later to become the Americal Division, when it arrived
in I Corps in 1967, "provided their own communications into the TADC
of the 1st MAW at Da Nang."* The Army division could then lodge requests
for preplanned and emergency close air support with the Marines. Mostly,
however, the "Americal relied ... on the Seventh Air Force for preplanned
support," although the Marine wing made supplementary sorties available.
Anderson, nevertheless, insisted that the arrangement required that
the supported unit provide "its own communications into the Marine system
. . .


* Army General William B. Rosson, who commanded Task Force Oregon in
the Spring of 1967, remembered that he was supported by both the Seventh
Air Force and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing then and, "the support was
timely and eftcctive overall. Admittedly, the Task Force required duplicate
Air Force and Marine liaison and control parry assets, but this did
not pose a difficult problem for III MAF. (We had deployed with normal
Air Force liaison and control party elements; Marine elements joined
us Irom Chu Lai.)" Gen William B. Rosson, USA, Comments on draft, did
27Feb96 (Vietnam Comment File).







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