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air support for Army and allied forces. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, however, remained direcrly under III MAF and flew close air support tor Marine and allied units in I Corps.5

In South Vietnam, General Westmoreland controlled his tactical ground
forces through three regional commands, roughly corresponding with the
corps areas of the Republic of Vietnam. III MAF was in the north in
I Corps; the U.S. Army's I Field Force, Vietnam, was in II Corps, consisting
of the central highlands and central coastal provinces of South Vietnam;
and the Army's II Field Force, Vietnam, operated both in III Corps,
centered around the capital city of Saigon, and IV Corps, which included
the populous Mekong Delta. All told, MACV ground combat forces, including
Marines and "Free World" troops from Korea, Australia, and
Thailand consisted of 11 divisions and 14 separate brigades and task
forces adding up to 118 maneuver battalions counting both infantry and
tank units. Some 60 Army artillery battalions, two heavily reinforced
Marine artillery regiments, a 500-man New Zealand artillery battalion,
11 Marine helicopter squadrons, and 96 Army aviation companies supported
these maneuver units.6

The Navy and the Army divided the logistic support for U.S. and allied
troops in Vietnam. General Westmoreland retained direct command of the
Army component, the U.S. Army, Vietnam, and had operational control
of the naval, U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam. The latter, through its 22,000-man
Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, which included the 3d Naval Construction
Brigade, furnished heavy engineering and common item supplies for all
U.S. and Korean forces in I Corps. U.S. Army, Vietnam, through its subordinate
engineer and logistic commands, had the responsibility for the remaining
corps areas. Looking back several years later. General Westmoreland
observed that by the "beginning of '68 we had our logistic structure
finished: ports and airfields were basically completed . . . ."7

The various U.S. service components in South Vietnam complicated and
occasionally blurred the command arrangements within MACV. For example,
under the operational control of MACV, General Cushman also reported
directly through Marine channels to the Commanding General, Fleet Marine
Force, Pacific, Lieutenant General Victor H. "Brute" Krulak.
Krulak retained administrative command and overall responsibility for
the readiness, training, and logistic support of all Marine forces in
the Pacific. Although not in the operational chain of command, General
Krulak was not one to deny General

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