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problems, Marines learned valuable lessons in air-ground coordination for future operations.*

HARVEST MOON/LIEN KET 18 was the last of the Marines' big battles in 1965. These large-scale efforts had become a regular feature of the war for General Walt's forces. During the last half of its first calendar year in country. III MAF conducted 15 operations of battalion-size or larger. American intelligence agencies indicated that during 1966, General Walt's forces would face even larger enemy forces as North Vietnamese troops entered South Vietnam to join their Viet Cong comrades. The big unit actions were only one aspect of the Marine war, nevertheless, in I Corps. According to General Krulak:

... we cannot be entrapped in the dangerous premise that destruction of the VC organized units per se is the whole answer to winning the war, any more than we can accept the erroneous view that pacification and civic action will solve the problem if major enemy forces are free to roam the countryside.18

*Colonel Roy C. Gray, Jr., who relieved Colonel Yunck as G-3 of the 1st MAW, agreed with Colonel Brown's remarks on coordination. He later wrote: "The Wing G-3 Section subsequently assigned a senior experienced aviator to TF headquarters on operations such as HARVEST MOON and Air/Ground preplanning and coordination was given greater emphasis." Col Roy C. Gray, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 310ct76 (Vietnam Comment File). Although agreeing with Colonel Brown's observations. Colonel Peatross attributed the lack of coordination to too much secrecy and inexperience on the part of the HARVEST MOON planners, stating "there could be no better advance planning without experience on the part of the planners." MajGen Oscar F. Peatross, Comments on draft MS, dtd 260ct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

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