many pressing needs. Through that period, Eisenhower drafted MacArthur's speeches, lobbied Congress, and helped to prepare Chief of Staff annual reports that have since been called models of their kind. Eisenhower's confidential work for MacArthur included careful studies of mobilization and the relationship of military power to the industrial capacity of the nation. Other papers considered mechanization, mobilization, and the development of air power in relation to ground battle.

MacArthur recognized his subordinate's talents and considered him the best staff officer in the Army, remarking that his principal strength was an ability to look at problems from the point of view of the high command. When MacArthur went to the Philippines as military adviser to the government of that commonwealth in 1935, he took Eisenhower along as his assistant. For the next four years, his duties in helping to create the defenses of those islands were as much diplomatic as they were military, inasmuch as they involved frequent coordination with the American High Commissioner and with the government of the Philippines.

Eisenhower returned to the United States at the end of 1939. The next two, fast-paced years were crucial ones in which the experience of filling a series of key administrative and coordinative posts in an operational Army rounded out his professional education. During his first year back in the country, he briefly commanded a battalion of the 15th Infantry and then served as regimental executive officer. Late in 1940 he became chief of staff of the 3d Infantry Division at Fort Lewis. March 1941 saw yet another reassignment, as Eisenhower progressed to become chief of staff of the newly activated IX Corps. Finally, in June 1941, he stepped up to the headquarters of Third Army at San Antonio. There he took up duties as chief of staff to Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger.

From his vantage point in Third Army, Eisenhower studied the problems of the expanding Army and grasped the nature of the citizen-soldier force he was helping to build. It was obvious to him that the discipline and traditions of the Regular Army were inappropriate for the mobilization Army. The new soldiers needed thorough training, but they also had to understand the reasons for the tasks they were required to do. He likewise observed the problems as officers with little practical experience began to grapple with command of combat units. Success in higher command, he concluded, demanded officers who were orderly and logical without being slow and methodical, and who struck an appropriate balance between charisma and empty flashiness.