decision which would set the stage for
total German destruction in Northern France.
TacAir Omnipotent:
Mortain and the Falaise-Argentan Pocket
Mortain and Falaise, like Wadi el
Far'a, Guadalajara, and more recently Mitla Pass and the Kuwait City-Basra Road
have come to symbolize a particular form of warfare: the destruction of closely
packed columns of troops and vehicles by constant and merciless fighter-bomber
strikes in concert with action on the ground. Any chance of withdrawing with
troops, equipment, and vehicles in good order was lost to the Wehrmacht due to
the violence of the breakout from the beachhead at Normandy, and Hitler's order
to von Kluge to stand firm in Normandy. As a result of Hitler's directive, the
Wehrmacht launched a general offensive against Mortain, the weakest spot in the
Allied line, on August 7. It failed amid stubborn resistance on the ground and
intensive fighter-bomber attacks.
Next Allied forces began to batter the
enemy ground forces caught in the Falaise-Argentan pocket-fighting characterized
by combined infantry-armor-artillery-air attacks directed against units
desperately attempting to escape eastward. Though some German forces did escape
through the ever-narrowing gap, they did so without equipment and in a state of
disarray and almost complete demoralization. By the end of August, Allied forces
had liberated Paris, advanced to the Seine, won the Battle of France, and set
the stage for the Battle of Germany. Ahead lay some particularly bitter
fighting-notably Montgomery's botched airborne invasion of Holland and the
ferocity of the German counterthrust in the Ardennes. But as of the end of
August, only the most ardent Nazi would still have faith in an ultimate German
victory.
The attack on Mortain was allegedly
revealed by Ultra-the Allies' breaking of the German codes-so that the American
forces were able to set up their defense in advance of the German thrust. This
might be called the 'myth of Mortain.' In fact. Ultra did not offer a
forewarning enabling the defenders to prepare for the attack. On August 2,
Hitler had ordered von Kluge to prepare for an attack westward to the coastline,
but this early indication of trouble ahead did not make its way from the Allied
intelligence organizations to Bradley's 12th Army Group. On the evening of the
6th, orders went
