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D-Day

Sprawled bodies on beach of Tarawa, testifying to ferocity of the struggle for this stretch of sand.  (NARA)

The Marines landed Nov. 20, 1943, on Betios northwest shore. The 2nd Marine Division came up with the innovative idea of using logistical support amphibian tractors (LVTs) as assault craft. LVTs would be effective in crossing the islands fringing reef and man-made obstacles. Unfortunately, there were enough LVTs only for the first three assault waves. After that, unless the tide was right, the Marines would have trouble getting the remaining waves across the reef in Higgins boats (LCVPs), which had a draft of 3-1/2 feet.

Betios northwest shore was divided into Red Beach 1, 2 and 3, respectively, from west to east. A 500-yard pier marked the boundary between Red Beach 2 and Red 3 and extended north into the lagoon just beyond the fringing reef. The short western side of the island was designated as Green Beach. The Marines hoped to land a three-battalion front on the Red beaches, sweep across the island (a total distance of about 600 yards), capture the airfield and pin the enemy down on the islands west end.

Sustained naval bombardment and carrier-based bomber strikes preceded the Marines. Timing and communications problems made these less effective than needed, but Japanese gunners were stopped long enough to allow the first three assault waves to reach the beach relatively unscathed.  The 2nd Scout-Sniper Platoon led by 1st Lieutenant William D. Hawkins landed first, winning the pier from enemy snipers.  Then, the first elements of the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines came in on Red Beach 1. On the left of their beach, at the boundary with Red Beach 2, was a Japanese strong point that raked the Marines coming in on the west side of Red 1 with machine gun fire. Once landed, the Marines on Red 1 would take 35-50 percent casualties. Red 3 was the next beach reached, by the 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines. Part of this group got as far inland as the airstrip before the Japanese recovered from naval bombardment. This group took only 25 casualties in landing.

The most violently opposed landing was that of 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines on Red 2. Some of these troops were driven off course by machine gun and antiboat fire and  forced to land on Red 1. The remainder, who reached Red 2, managed to carve out a beachhead only about 50 yards deep. Once the first three assault waves were in, two waves of landing boats were set to follow. These carried additional troops, tanks and artillery. Unfortunately, the irregular tides in the Gilberts worked against the landing force, and there was not enough water depth over the reef for the landing boats to cross. Infantry and howitzer crews had to wade ashore with weapons and equipment.

These men suffered the worst casualties of D-day. The only cover from Japanese machine gunners and riflemen was the pier; many did not reach it. Many of those who did were separated from their units and chain of command, and were unable to move to their proper beaches. At this point, the momentum of the assault bogged down because the reef effectively barred the  landing boats, the number of amphtracs was being rapidly reduced, units were disorganized and communications were spotty. The fierce action on the beach did not stop for the Marines to regroup, establish command posts, move in supplies or carry out their wounded. In the words of one Marine history, only the grim determination of individual Marines, who simply kept coming, in spite of all the enemy could hurl at them, offset the confusion.

By evening, the Marines situation was tenuous at best. Of about 5,000 men who had gone ashore, 1,500 were either killed or wounded. Marines held a perimeter about 700 yards wide and 300 yards deep at the base of the pier, and an area about 150 yards by 500 yards at the northwest tip of the island. Most believed that a Japanese counterattack was bound to come during the night. If it had, it may well have succeeded. Julian Smith said that the Japanese commander lost the battle of Tarawa that night by failing to attack. Historians say the Japanese counterattack did not come because Japanese  communications had been severely damaged by naval gunfire. At nightfall, Navy ships cruised offshore for protection against air and submarine attack. Throughout D-day, the destroyers Ringgold, Dashiell, Frazier and Anderson had provided gunfire support on call to Marines ashore, a significant contribution to the course of the battle. Frazier continued this duty throughout the night.

Bombing and strafing had gone on all day--32 strikes in all, launched from carriers and escort carriers. Navy medical corpsmen continued working throughout the night to ferry the wounded over the reef in rubber rafts, while Marines carried water, pack howitzers, ammunition and medical supplies ashore.

Research for this fact sheet was provided by Alexander Molnar, U.S. Marine Corps/U.S. Army (Ret.).

Source: Marine Corps History

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