All divisions and regiments agreed that the wisdom of enveloping one or more of the enemy's flanks, rather than attacking frontally, had been repeatedly demonstrated. When the Japanese resisted vigorously from a pocket or strong point, the best technique was to bypass the pocket, continue the advance, and reduce the pocket at leisure.

Except in rare instances, advancing units usually halted early enough in the afternoon to establish all-round defenses and permit defensive artillery and mortar concentrations to be registered before the fall of darkness. Halting in the afternoon gave the troops time to dig foxholes and emplacements, string barbed wire, emplace and site heavy weapons, and camouflage the position as much as possible. By halting in daylight, troops in the jungle could also determine the location of the units on their flanks. If this was not done, inexperienced troops were apt to fire on each other during the night. All movement within a defensive area ceased after nightfall.

Infantry fighting was close work, as most targets lay less than fifty yards from the infantrymen. The nature of the terrain broke most engagements into "small unit scraps" in which "success is dependent upon the individual soldiers, NCO's, and platoon leaders' ability to act promptly and intelligently when confronted with a situation."2

The soldiers and marines had seen repeatedly demonstrated the obvious truth that success in war demands skillful and vigorous leadership from all ranks charged with the responsibility of providing leadership. Those whose leadership faltered under the stress of combat had to be relieved of their commands.

Weapons

American weapons had generally proved to be both potent and practical. The U. S. Rifle, M1 (Garand) had shown itself to be superior to the M1903 (Springfield), with which many marines had been armed. Other small arms were less satisfactory. The .45-caliber automatic pistol found little use. The Marines' Reising Gun, a .45-caliber submachine gun, proved to be almost worthless.3 The .45 caliber Thompson submachine gun, while efficient, sounded too much like Japanese .25 caliber weapons, and could not be safely employed at the front. Bayonets and knives were valuable in close combat at night, as were hand grenades, but rifle and antitank grenades lacked sufficiently sensitive fuzes.

The larger infantry weapons were extremely efficient, although most troops complained of their weight. The light air-cooled .30-caliber machine gun sup-

2. Gavan, Personal Account, p. 4.

3. 1st Mar Div Rpt, II, 16.