Confederate President Jefferson DAVIS, not one to bow to the pressures of the public opinion, quickly summoned Bragg with a telegram. Bragg's explanation for his retreat from Kentucky was a simple one; it was necessary to save his starving army. To appease Bragg's rebellious generals, Davis called Leonidas Polk and Kirby Smith to Richmond, where he placated each with a third star. Davis then persuaded them to return to their duties. In late November, Davis also assigned General Joseph E. Johnston to overall command of the Western Theater. Placing Kirby Smith under Bragg's jurisdiction, Davis renamed Bragg's army, now designating it the Army of Tennessee.

While in Richmond, Bragg had offered a new plan of operation for Davis' approval. The plan called for the Confederate army to concentrate its forces at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, and from there to launch an attack on NASHVILLE. For this reason, Bragg had already sent General John C. Breckinridge, and his 6000-man division, to take command at Murfreesboro and prepare for the defense of Middle Tennessee. Often described as cantankerous, paranoid and a strict disciplinarian, Bragg, a veteran of the Mexican War, would retain the army he had inherited from BEAUREGARD on June 27.

The North was equally disappointed in General Don Carlos Buell's performance at PERRYVILLE, though they had retained possession of Kentucky by default. Buell's refusal to pursue Bragg's retreating army caused LINCOLN great concern. Buell insisted that lack of discipline was to blame at Perryville, and the roads were too rough for a subsequent pursuit. Lincoln's response to Buell's ineffectiveness was to relieve him of command on October 23, replacing him with Major General William S. ROSECRANS.

Rosecrans had enjoyed moderate success, rising rapidly in the ranks from Colonel of Engineers in the Department of Ohio to the command of forces in Western Virginia. Rosecrans later joined GRANT in Tennessee, driving Sterling Price from Iuka and defeating Van Dorn at Corinth. In replacing Buell, "Old Rosy" Rosecrans knew what was expected of him after receiving these stern words from HALLECK: "Neither the country nor the Government will much longer put up with the inactivity of some of our armies and generals." Described as a hard drinker, yet devoutly religious man, the 43-year-old Rosecrans was said to be quick to anger but just as quick to forgive. Under Rosecrans, the Army of the Cumberland was created.

Before his removal, Buell had already started his army towards Nashville, and Rosecrans did not change these orders. Arriving on November 7, Rosecrans set about solving the supply problems for his army. Despite Halleck's threats of removal in early December, the stubborn Rosecrans refused to budge from Nashville until he felt his army was ready for the upcoming campaign, replying: "I need no other stimulus to make me do my duty than the knowledge of what it is. To threats of removal or the like I must be permitted to say that I am insensible."

While the Army of Tennessee suffered from exposure and disease in East Tennessee, Breckinridge ordered a series of cavalry raids on Nashville. On November 6, John Hunt MORGAN attacked Nashville from the North, while Nathan Bedford FORREST attacked from the South. Little resulted from these raids, but Morgan's subsequent victory at HARTSVILLE, during a third raid on December 7, helped boost morale for the Southern soldiers.

The advance elements of the Confederate Army began to arrive at Murfreesboro, from Tullahoma, on November 20th. During early December, while Bragg's army sat straddling the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad, Davis persistently urged Johnston to detach 9,000 of Carter Stevenson's division to reinforce PEMBERTON at VICKSBURG. When Johnston demurred, insisting Bragg needed these men to defeat Rosecrans, Davis visited the army at Murfreesboro on December 10th. Upon Davis' departure on December 13, not only did Bragg lose Stevenson's division but Forrest was sent on a raid of West Tennessee, and Morgan on a raid into Kentucky. The absence of these forces would be the deciding factor on Rosecrans' decision to move against Bragg.

While the Confederates were enjoining the Christmas festivities and generosity of the local citizens at Murfreesboro, the Federal army in Nashville was despondent and hungry. On Christmas Day, Rosecrans was at last ready for battle. He issued orders for the Army of the Cumberland to advance on Murfreesboro the following day. Before the advancing column could get underway, it began to rain heavily on the evening of the 25th.

On the morning of the 26th, in a cold gray dawn, three Federal columns left Nashville and headed south for Murfreesboro, traveling three separate routes. Of the 82,000 men available to Rosecrans, only 44,000 would take part in the advance, the others remaining in Nashville or guarding the railroad to Louisville. General Crittenden, on the Federal left, took his three divisions down the Nashville Pike. McCook, with three divisions and Stanley's cavalry brigade, were in the center traveling down the Nolensville Pike, while George THOMAS, on the right, was moving down the FRANKLIN turnpike. McCook was to march to Triune then turn eastward toward Murfreesboro, while Thomas would turn eastward, cross in the rear of McCook at Nolensville then continue to Murfreesboro. Thomas would have less than half of his command with him, with one division and three brigades.

The Army of Tennessee was aligned in a 32-mile-long crescent shape, its center on Murfreesboro facing Nashville. General HARDEE commanded the left wing, based at Triune, which was 14 miles of Murfreesboro. The center, at Murfreesboro, was commanded by General POLK, while the right, located 12 miles away at Readyville, was held by General McCown's division of Hardee's Corps. Since detaching Forrest and Morgan, Bragg had reorganized his cavalry, placing it under the command of the twenty-three-year-old Joseph WHEELER. Wheeler's troopers constantly patrolled the countryside between Murfreesboro and Nashville, watching for Rosecrans.

As soon as the Federal army advanced, it ran into Wheeler's cavalry units. The first contact was made at 7 a.m. when McCook's wing attacked General Wharton's cavalry at Nolensville. Wharton withdrew to a line of ridges just north of Triune, where his artillery slowed McCook's advance for a considerable part of the day. Upon hearing the artillery barrage, Thomas turned eastward to march to McCook's assistance. Wharton's delaying action would gain Bragg time to consolidate his forces.

At the same time McCook was being stalled, Crittenden ran into Wheeler's outposts just north of LaVergne, on the Nashville Pike. Pushing forward through LaVergne, Crittenden would then be slowed by an entire cavalry brigade, reinforced by George Maney's brigade of Tennesseans. Rather than making a rapid advance on the Confederates, Rosecrans was constantly being forced to stop and clear the way of Confederate cavalry.

In the meantime, Bragg called in McCown from Readyville and Hardee from Triune. Unsure of where the main Federal attack might come from, he threw up a defensive line across all approaches to Murfreesboro from the northwest. Polk was placed a mile west of town, facing west and across the Franklin, Wilkinson and Nashville Pikes, with the Stones River curving to his back. Hardee was placed an equal distance to the northwest, across the river from Polk and extending from the east bank of the river through a series of hills to the Lebanon road. To meet an attack from Lebanon, Hardee's line faced due north, away from the Federal approach from Nashville, with Breckinridge's division in the forefront, CLEBURNE's division in the rear.

When Crittenden approached Stones River in the late afternoon of December 29, he could plainly see a large portion of the Confederate army on the banks. But Rosecrans had told him Bragg was retreating and had ordered him to occupy the town. Despite the obvious odds against him, Crittenden ordered Wood and Palmer to attack. Wood, despite protests, then sent Harker's brigade across the river. Driving back Confederate skirmishers, Harker's men ran headlong into Breckinridge's entire division and were stopped dead in their tracks. Crittenden decided to withdraw and await the arrival of Rosecrans.

Bragg, assuming correctly that the Federals would not attack on the 29th or 30th, sent Wheeler's cavalry to harass the Federal rear. Wheeler's troopers struck at LaVergne, where McCook's supply train of 300 wagons was parked. Quickly, they then moved over to Nolensville, where 150 wagons of ammunition and medicines were captured. Both strikes had netted the gray horsemen four wagon trains, 1,000 captured soldiers, weapons and fresh horses.

After spending the evening of the 29th cold, wet and miserable, the Federal army was up before dawn to get themselves into position. Crittenden's line was anchored on the river to the north and extended across the Nashville Pike. Thomas placed Rousseau's division in reserve, and advanced Negley's division through the cedars between Crittenden and the Wilkinson Pike. McCook was placed on the right of Negley to extend the line southward to the Franklin road.

The orders for the next day's battle, verbally given by Rosecrans, were somewhat vague in that McCook was unsure of his role. Crittenden was to lead off the attack on Bragg's right, with Thomas to support the attack. McCook was told to "…take a strong position; if the enemy attacks you, fall back slowly, refusing your right, contesting the ground inch by inch. If the enemy does not attack you, you will attack him, not vigorously, but warmly." Rosecrans would later state that it was his intention for Crittenden to cross the river and punch through Breckinridge's forces on the Confederate right.

The evening of the 30th, Rosecrans hoped to deceive Bragg by ordering McCook to extend his right and build many campfires. By doing so, he hoped that Bragg would think the main threat was on his left. Apparently the ruse worked, as Bragg concluded he should not only meet the threat there but attack in force on his left. During the evening, he made adjustments accordingly. As it happened, both commanders had adopted identical battle plans -- to attack each other's right flank.

Hardee took the divisions of McCown and Cleburne from behind Breckinridge, marched south behind Polk's line, crossed to the west side of the river and moved on Polk's left. Thus Hardee extended his line across Franklin road, with McCown in front, supported by Cleburne. Wharton deployed his 2,000 cavalrymen on Hardee's left. This realignment left only Breckinridge's division, supported by Brig. Gen. Pegram's cavalry, to hold the Confederate right.

During the cold hours of darkness, the two armies lay facing each other in some places not more than 100 yards away. Bragg's line was split by the west fork of Stones River, with intervening cornfields and glades of red cedars. The rocky outcroppings and dense glades, while providing cover for infantry, made it difficult to maneuver large bodies of troops, horses and artillery.

The Federal position appeared stronger, with Crittenden firmly anchored on Stones River, his line running through a four-acre clump of cedars known locally as the Round Forest. Before the day was over, this forest would be dubbed "Hell's Half Acre." McCook's assignment seemed the toughest, with his far right straddling the Franklin road. His left division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Philip SHERIDAN, extended south from the Wilkinson Pike. On Sheridan's right, in succession, were the divisions of Jefferson Davis [no relation to the CSA president] and Richard Johnson.

The Federal attack was to take place at 7 a.m., immediately following breakfast. Though the element of surprise was crucial for both sides, signs of the Confederates impending attack were initially ignored. Sheridan, noticing movements as early as 2 a.m., warned McCook to be prepared early. Although McCook issued no new orders, Sheridan elected on his own to prepare his division and those next to him to brace for an attack. Despite the alert, the Federals were unprepared for what was about to happen next.

As many of the Union troops were huddled around the campfires at 6 a.m., arms stacked and awaiting breakfast, ghostly shapes in the gray mist of predawn were seen in the distance, in front of McCook's position. Quietly, they came on, 11,000 men of seven brigades of McCown's and Cleburne's divisions. Only when they were a short distance from Johnson's Federals did the Confederates scream their Rebel yell. They smashed into McCook's far right, routing two of Johnson's brigades. The turning of the Federal right flank exposed the right of General Davis' division. Davis adjusted his line to meet the onslaught. Despite being outnumbered, the new Federal line refused to give ground and Cleburne's attack began to falter.

In the Confederate center, Polk's attack began at 7 a.m. but in a haphazard manner. Though the Federals were initially pushed back by Loomis' men, the attacking Confederates suddenly found themselves exposed to an enfilading fire. Manigault's brigade, who was supposed to support Loomis, failed to advance until Loomis was forced to retreat. This error was thought to be that of their division commander, Benjamin CHEATHAM. Reported to be drunk that morning, Cheatham allowed Loomis to advance an hour late, with another hour passing before Manigault joined in the assault. Though Bragg tried to correct the mistake, the opportunity to overwhelm the Federal right was lost.

Rosecrans, who was on the Federal left flank preparing for his attack, seemed unconcerned with the noise on his right flank. Together, Crittenden and Rosecrans watched as Van Cleve's division waded across the river towards Breckinridge's division. As remnants of McCook's units began to filter back towards the Federal center at 7 a.m., Rosecrans suddenly became concerned. Sending a courier to McCook's division, he awaited word from his right. When the courier returned to inform Rosecrans that the Federal right had been turned, one of McCook's messengers assured Rosecrans that McCook was merely being heavily pressed. Reassured, Rosecrans sent word for McCook to "dispose his troops to best advantage and hold his ground."

Word soon reached Rosecrans of Willich's flight and capture, followed by an appeal for reinforcements by McCook. The situation now appeared serious enough that Rosecrans directed Thomas to send Rousseau's division to Sheridan's rear. He also halted Van Cleve's advance, redirecting him to assemble near the railroad.

During this time, the Confederates continued to attack the new Federal right flank but were repulsed with heavy losses on the first and second attempts. The third assault enveloped Davis' right, forcing him to retreat and thereby exposing Sheridan's right. At 9:30 a.m., Sheridan made a counterattack which gave him sufficient time to withdraw to a new position behind the Nashville Pike and to the right of Negley's division. By 10 a.m., the new Federal line now formed a V shape, with Sheridan's troops at the apex, Rousseau's division on the right and Negley's division on the left. In this formation, Sheridan was forced to conduct a fighting withdrawal northward, where he re-formed a line just north of the Wilkinson Pike.

By mid-morning, Bragg's army had suffered severely in the constant battering of the Federal line. Hardee's Corps had lost one-third in killed or wounded, while Polk's Corps had suffered 30 percent. Nonetheless, Bragg was encouraged by the crushing of the Federal right flank. When Hardee asked for reinforcements at 10 a.m., Bragg ordered Breckinridge to send two brigades in support of Hardee. But Breckinridge, still under the impression that Van Cleve was continuing his advance, refused to obey Bragg's orders, sending only one brigade. Since Bragg had received erroneous reports from Pegram that Federals were also advancing from the north, down the road from Lebanon, he rescinded his order to Breckinridge. However, he did order Breckinridge to cross the Stones River and drive the advancing Federals back. A surprised Breckinridge would find the enemy in his front gone when he did advance.

On the Federal right, Sheridan's men had ran out of ammunition and were forced to withdraw, leaving a gap between Negley and Rousseau, which the Confederates quickly exploited. All three of Sheridan’s brigade commanders had been killed, including Brig. Gen. Joshua Sill. By noon, the Federals had been forced back to a new but stronger defensive line, with Hazen's brigade stubbornly clinging to possession of the Round Forest.

The final Confederate assaults were repulsed by this new Federal line. Chalmers' brigade, held on the extreme right of Wither's division, attacked the Round Forest shortly after noon. Having to cross an open field, his brigade was cut to pieces by Hazen's men and the artillery. After Chalmers himself was wounded, his brigade fell back. Donelson's brigade, Cheatham's division, was the next to make an effort. Breaking through the Federal line just west of the Round Forest, it captured 1,000 prisoners and 11 guns. Donelson was eventually forced to retreat due to the Round Forest remaining in Federal control.

Late in the afternoon, four brigades of Breckinridge were brought over to try and break the stronghold on "Hell's Half Acre." First Adams and Jackson, then Preston and Pillow, were repulsed with heavy losses, their futile attempts evidenced by the scores of littered bodies in the cornfield. Breckinridge's attacks marked the last of the desperate fighting on the first day.

It was during a lull in which Rosecrans feared Hazen's men were beginning to falter that he personally rode into the Round Forest. Accompanied by his chief of staff, Colonel Garesche, and others, he recklessly galloped within Confederate artillery range. Within minutes, a cannonball severed the head from Garesche's body. Though Rosecrans showed no emotion at the time, he was deeply affected by his friend's death -- so much so that he cut the buttons from his own uniform and marked them "…Buttons I wore the day Garesche was killed."

Bragg, learning that the Federals had strengthened their right, reasoned that the Federal left flank might now be weakened. With Hardee's weary troops stalled on the right, which Rosecrans had earlier fortified with Van Cleve and Wood, Bragg determined to smash the Federal left. Before new orders could be issued, Hardee called off the fighting for the day.

Despite the terrible casualties the Army of Tennessee suffered, Bragg and Hardee considered the day a victory. This was based on the ground they had gained during the day, their troops camping within 500 yards of the railroad embankment for the night. When Bragg learned that Federal wagons were moving north toward Nashville, he further concluded that the Army of the Cumberland was in retreat. These wagons were being sent back to Nashville with the Federal wounded.

Rosecrans began his evening discussing a possible retreat with his senior officers. Stanley, the cavalry commander, and McCook both favored a withdrawal, while Crittenden was noncommittal. Accounts state that Thomas, who had fallen asleep during the meeting, awoke at the word "retreat," stating vehemently, "This army does not retreat." The Federal commander then decided to stay, at least until the next day.

During the bitterly cold night, a rain began to fall on the battlefield, numbing the dying and the wounded. Many soldiers were too cold to move, while others looked for their friends or answered the cries of the wounded. In some instances, the dead were frozen to the ground, completing the circle of dust-to-dust. In the town, the scene was one of chaos, with ambulances pushing their way through crowded streets. It was a New Year's Eve that many would want to forget but doubtless they ever would or could.

When New Year's Day dawned, Bragg was stunned to find that the Federals were still in their lines. He was so sure they would retreat that he had made no contingencies in the event they didn't. Rather than devise a strategy, Bragg sank into a depression that seemed to immobilize him for the balance of the day. The only changes made were Polk's Corps moving to the now abandoned Round Forest, and Breckinridge re-crossing the river to his original position on the right.

Rosecrans was glad for the respite, spending the day riding among the troops to offer words of encouragement and burying his dead. Though most of his men received no evening meal, their spirits were high, one officer noting, "We all glory in the obstinacy with which Rosecrans has clung to his position."

The morning of January 2 began quietly and looked like it might be a repeat of the day before. Again, Bragg hoped that Rosecrans might have withdrawn during the night. Finding this not to be the case, he ordered his artillery to probe the Federal center on the west side of the Round Forest. When Federal batteries responded with vigor, it left no doubt of the Federal’s determination to stay put. Bragg then ordered the placement of guns on the high ground in front of Breckinridge. It occurred to him that he might be able to enfilade the Federal position on the west side of the river. At around noon, an officer returned to inform Bragg that the high ground he wanted was already occupied by Beatty's Federal division and artillery. Bragg, now concerned that Polk's troops were threatened by Beatty's guns, decided he must take that high ground from Beatty. Breckinridge was then summoned to Bragg's headquarters.

On his own, Breckinridge had already spent the morning testing and scouting out Beatty's strength in his front. Finding Beatty's division strongly posted in two lines on the ridge, with a wide-open field of fire in their front, Breckinridge was incredulous when Bragg gave him orders to attack.

The assault was to take place at 4 p.m. so that there would be little opportunity for the Federals to launch a counterattack before dark. Bragg promised Breckinridge the support of Polk's artillery and the cavalry brigades of Wharton's and Pegram's. Though Breckinridge protested vehemently, Bragg only became more obstinate. When the 1st Kentucky Brigade (Breckinridge's Orphan Brigade) heard of Bragg's order they threatened mutiny.

Breckinridge's 4500 men were positioned with Hanson's Orphans on the left, Palmer's Tennesseans on the right (now led by Brig. Gen. Gideon Pillow). Gibson's and Preston's brigades were placed in support 200 yards back. Following an argument between Breckinridge and Bragg's chief of artillery, Captain Felix Robertson, two staff officers were sent to locate Wharton and Pegram. Breckinridge had wanted Robertson to move his guns up with the attack, but Robertson refused, his guns staying in the rear as the battle played out. As to Wharton and Pegram, Wharton would only learn of the attack when he saw the infantry advance. Pegram could not be located and was not in position when the time came to advance.

At 3 p.m., Bragg notified Polk of the attack and ordered his artillery to support it. Though Polk insisted that his position was not threatened by Beatty, he prepared his guns to offer the support to Breckinridge.

Rosecrans was not only aware of the impending Confederate assault but called for reinforcements to the area with the divisions of Davis and Hascall. In addition, Crittenden's chief of artillery, Major John Mendenhall, began amassing more guns on the hill across the river from Beatty's troops. By 4 p.m., 58 pieces of artillery had been assembled to contest Breckinridge's division.

As the Confederates stepped off in a freezing rain that had turned to sleet, Beatty's men scrambled from their exposed position on the slopes to behind the crest of the ridge. Across 600 yards of open ground, under a barrage of artillery, the Kentuckians and Tennesseans advanced at the quick-step. As the opposing lines drew closer, a sudden hushed silence blanketed the field. The Federals guns had ceased firing for fear of hitting their own men.

Since the ridge angled away from the Confederate line, Hanson's Kentuckians made contact on the left first. With orders to fire one volley and then use the bayonet, Hanson's men smashed into Price's men at a dead run. The Federal line was overwhelmed by the gray tidal wave.

On the Confederate right, Pillow's men rushed to a fence and began firing volley after volley into Grose's troops. The fence soon went down under the weight of the Tennesseans as they rushed over it. The Federal left flank began to crumble, then finally the entire Federal line along the ridge gave way. As their flight became a rout, they ran through Grider's reserve brigade behind them. Grider was soon flanked by Hanson's 6th Kentucky and ordered a withdrawal to the foot of the ridge. In less than 30 minutes, Beatty's entire line had been swept away and Breckinridge had achieved his objective.

Now was the time to stop and bring up artillery to the ridge they had gained, but the taste of victory was too strong. Disregarding the shouts from their officers to halt, with the 2nd and 6th Kentucky leading the way, the excited Confederates chased the fleeing Federals all the way to the river. As soon as they topped the crest of the ridge, they came into view of Mendenhall's guns at McFadden's Ford, but that didn't stop some Confederates from actually crossing the river. It wasn't until shot and shell began slamming into them at a rate of 100 rounds per minute, did the pursuers halt.

As Federal artillery cut large swaths among the milling Confederates, Colonel John F. Miller ordered his Federal brigade to counterattack. Miller's brigade charged across the river into the remnants of Hanson's and Pillow's brigades. Following Miller was regiments from Stanley's brigade, then Negley's and Palmer's. The tide of battle was now flowing the other way. Try as they may, Confederate officers could not halt the retreat, and by 4:45 p.m., the rout of the Confederates was complete.

Watching from the Nashville Pike, Bragg ordered Gen. J. Patton ANDERSON's brigade to move across the river and help cover Breckinridge's retreat, but the Federals decided to call it quits for the day. Breckinridge was devastated as he saw the thinned ranks of his division. Reportedly in tears when he passed by his old brigade, Breckinridge cried out, "My poor Orphans! They have cut it to pieces." His men had fought bravely but in the end he had lost 1,700 of them in a needless effort.

That evening, both armies spent the night in gathering up the dead and wounded. The hospitals were overflowing, especially the Confederate ones in Murfreesboro. Rosecrans gave a local minister permission to take the body of Confederate Brigadier General James E. Rains to Nashville for burial at his home. With his permission, he also gave strict orders that there was to be no fuss made over the affair, stating, "I will not permit it, sir, in the face of this bleeding army. My own officers are here, dead and unburied, and the bodies of my brave soldiers are yet on the field. You may have the corpse, sir; but remember distinctly that you cannot have an infernal secession 'pow-wow' over it in Nashville. Rosecrans then ordered his troops to build defenses, prepared to fight another day if necessary. Fortunately, help was on the way for Rosecrans, with the arrivals of James Spears' brigade and Colonel Dan McCook's brigade during the evening.

Before going to bed for the evening, Bragg and his generals met to discuss their next course of action. When none of them could agree on the best course, the meeting was adjourned for the evening with no changes. At 2 a.m., Bragg was awakened with news of the arrival of Federal reinforcements. He also received a note from Polk suggesting the best course of action would be to retreat. Initially, Bragg was adamant in his answer to Polk, stating, "Say to the general we shall maintain our position at every hazard." But during the course of the long evening, Bragg would have a change of heart.

At 10 a.m., on the morning of January 3rd, the Confederate commander called in Hardee and Polk for a conference. They both readily agreed that a retreat was necessary. During the afternoon, Bragg began sending his wagons south toward Shelbyville and Manchester. Polk would move out in the early evening, marching towards Shelbyville, while Hardee would follow in the morning and march to Tullahoma.

The struggle along Stones River was finally over, with 1,700 seriously wounded and sick Confederates left behind in hospitals. On the battlefield, Bragg would leave 27 percent of his army. Rosecrans would not pursue, having lost 23 percent of his forces to the struggle.

Stones River was proclaimed a victory by the Federals, and helped to secure Kentucky and NASHVILLE for future Union operations. LINCOLN was elated, telegraphing Rosecrans with a "God Bless you."

Of the 34,732 Confederates engaged, 9,239 were reported in killed or wounded. Of the 41,400 Federals engaged, 9,532 were reported killed or wounded.

---Written by Alethea D. Sayers