Tyler had a strong brigade of 3,500, Jackson roughly 6,000 men.

The Union lost around 1,000 men, Jackson about 600.

Jackson’s situation was what it had been a lot lately: he was between two enemy forces but by moving faster he still had the advantage. He’d detached Ewell to hold off Frémont while concentrating the bulk of his own men at Port Republic to attack Shields’ advance guard.

Jackson concentrated his forces east of the South Fork of the Shenandoah against the two isolated brigades (Tyler and Carroll) of Shields’ division, with Tyler in charge of the detachment. The Confederates crossed downriver and advanced unopposed until they found the Union pickets. Then it began in earnest.

Tyler had two weak brigades, but they fought hard indeed, and had very effective flanking artillery support. For a long while the situation was in doubt, then downright dire. Tyler was holding strong and Jackson’s own division, now under Winder, was making no headway while suffering heavily under the artillery lash. Jackson was moving reinforcements to clear away the Union guns, but needed time. Winder’s men staved off one Union attack by charging first, but that only brought them where the guns could hit them harder. Finally even the Stonewall Brigade could take it no longer and broke for the rear. But before Tyler could exploit the opening the reserves filled the line.

Then the flank attack hit the Union guns. Richard Taylor’s Louisianans had to charge three times, and paid heavily, but they overran the key battery. Tyler tried to pivot and counterattack up the hill, but three things happened. Taylor turned the guns around and shelled the Union infantry; a second reserve brigade arrived; and Jackson ordered a charge. The tables had been turned. From having solid flanks and numerical parity, the Union troops were faced by three strong brigades of infantry, had open flanks, and were getting hammered by their own guns.

It was enough, but Tyler’s men held their nerve long enough to get away. Jackson’s cavalry rounded up about 500 stragglers, but didn’t stand a chance of routing the whole column.

Frémont finally turned up, more because Jackson had withdrawn the troops blocking him than because he attacked. But when he arrived he found the river bridge burned and all he could do was unlimber his artillery and open fire. What he was shooting at was ambulances retrieving Federal wounded (Jackson had his own men rescued first) and Jackson ordered them recalled rather than risk any of his men.

Before the day was over Jackson marched away to Brown’s Gap. The next morning he was there, in a strong position against attacks from either Frémont or McDowell’s whole force, and also near the rail line to Richmond. Because neither Union force advanced (both were actually ordered to fall back) Jackson was now free to move east to Richmond and join Lee for the Seven Days’ Battles.

Content provided by:
eHistory Staff

Selected sources:
American Battlefield Protection Program, Heritage Preservation Services, National Park Service.